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Executive Summary
Behavioural tracking presents a significant privacy risk to Canadians, particularly when
their online behaviours reveal sensitive information that could be used to discriminate against
them. This concern is particularly relevant in the context of online health information seeking,
since searches can reveal details about health conditions and concerns that the individual may
wish to keep private. The privacy threats are exacerbated because behavioural tracking
mechanisms are large invisible to users, and many are unaware of the strategies and mechanisms
available to track online behaviour. In this project, we seek to document the behavioural tracking
practices of consumer health websites, and to examine the privacy policy disclosures of these
same practices. The results of our research demonstrate that tracking is widespread on consumer
health information websites; furthermore, sites recommended by Information Professionals are
similar to sites returned in Google searches in terms of overall tracking, though they show lower
levels of third-party advertiser presence. Privacy policy disclosure of tracking practices is largely
ineffective, and website visitors cannot easily determine tracking practices from a review of the
website privacy policies. Taken together, these results suggest that alternative mechanisms are
required to detect and/or mitigate or neutralize the behavioural tracking measures used on many
consumer health information websites.
Our goal is to raise awareness of behavioural tracking and potential responses by
communicating these results, and information about the risks of and responses to behavioural
tracking, to three different groups: the academic community, Library and Information Science
professionals, and the general public. This communication is carried out using a variety of
mechanisms including presentations, publications, public lectures, and an educational video. In
addition, we will provide education regarding behavioural tracking and associated risks to an
important group of professional intermediaries: librarians. Armed with this education, librarians
will be better able to select privacy-respecting information resources for their clients, and they
will also be better prepared to address behavioural tracking as part of the information literacy
education for the general public that they undertake as part of their professional practice.

iv

Sommaire
Le pistage comportemental présente un risque important pour la protection de la vie
privée des Canadiens, particulièrement lorsqu’il se produit dans des domaines où l’information
récoltée pourrait être utilisée comme outil de discrimination entre utilisateurs. La nature privée de
l’information en matière de santé amène un risque particulièrement élevé à cet égard pour la vie
privée des internautes, puisque les recherches d’information à ce sujet peuvent révéler des détails
qu’on désirerait garder pour soi. L’invisibilité des mécanismes utilisés pour le pistage
comportemental exacerbe de plus les risques pour la protection de la vie privée et bien des
Canadiens ne sont pas au courant des stratégies qu’ils peuvent employer pour contrer — ou, du
moins, atténuer — les effets du pistage comportemental.
Les résultats de ce projet de recherche indiquent que le pistage comportemental est
présent sur la majorité des sites web offrant de l’information relative à la santé. Les sites web
recommandés par les professionnels de l’information, en outre, ne font pas meilleure figure que
ceux trouvés à l’aide de recherches sur Google, bien qu’ils présent un taux un peu moins élevé de
pistage par des annonceurs. La divulgation des pratiques de pistage comportemental dans les
politiques de confidentialité est par ailleurs peu efficace et, à leur lecture, il est difficile pour un
internaute de déterminer quelles sont les pratiques de pistage comportemental en cours sur le site
web qu’il visite. Ces résultats suggèrent que des mécanismes alternatifs sont requis pour détecter
le pistage comportemental ou pour, du moins, en amoindrir les effets.
Notre but est de sensibiliser à la fois la communauté universitaire, celle des professionnels
de l’information et le public en général sur les effets du pistage comportemental et des
mécanismes qui peuvent être employés pour en atténuer les effets. Divisé en plusieurs volets, cet
exercice de dissémination prend plusieurs formes destinées à ces diverses communautés :
présentations, publications et production d’une vidéo. Nous procéderons de plus à un atelier de
formation continue auprès de bibliothécaires, qui pourront ainsi proposer à leurs usagers des sites
web plus respectueux de la vie privée et également disséminer ce savoir auprès de leurs usagers.
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Introduction
Most Canadians consider health information to be extremely sensitive. It
is inappropriate for this type of information to be used in online
behavioural advertising.
(Chantal Bernier, Interim Privacy Commissioner, January 15, 2014)
Health information is indeed considered among the most sensitive of personal information
(see, for example, Nass et al, 2009), and most discussions of health information privacy focus on
one particular issue: the protection of medical information, usually in the form of electronic
health records (e.g., Pritts, 2008; Whetton, 2013; Norgren, 2013). In the quote above, however,
Ms. Bernier is referring to a different kind of health information: details about health-related
online searches, collected by Google Adsense and used to target health-related advertisements
across multiple websites and over time1. She made her remark in a 2014 press release reporting
the results of an investigation of a consumer complaint regarding this activity that concluded that
the practice contravenes both online behavioural advertising guidelines issued by the Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and Google’s own privacy policy. The investigation,
triggered by a consumer complaint of being “followed” by advertisements for CPAP devices after
searching for information online using Google, documented the use of sensitive personal
information to deliver interest-based advertisements by one online advertising service (Google
Adsense). This raises an important question: how common is such tracking across consumer
health information websites?
Other research and the results of investigative reporting (see Soltani et al., 2009; Angwin,
2010) demonstrate that online behavioural tracking is a common and perhaps even ubiquitous
practice. These investigations examine a cross-section of commonly visited websites, and the
results are thus broadly representative of the behavioural tracking that Internet users are likely to
encounter on a regular basis. Among the websites examined in these studies, however, only a
small proportion are consumer health information sites: Soltani et al., 2009, for example, reports
the results of an analysis of the top 50 sites identified by Quantcast in 2009, and among these
1

https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2014/nr-c_140115_e.asp
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only one (WebMD) is a site that delivers consumer health information. Thus, these results tell us
relatively little about behavioural tracking practices on sites where users are likely to reveal, by
their activities, detailed information about their health status, health-related concerns, and healthrelated activities. The current project seeks to address this gap by examining behavioural tracking
practices on English and French language consumer health information websites. In addition, we
examine the disclosure practices regarding tracking on these sites. One important aspect of our
project is to contrast tracking activities on sites recommended by Library and Information
Science professionals with those sites, not recommended by these professionals, that consumers
would find on their own through internet searches for common health conditions. This contrast
provides insight into the degree to which information professionals are successfully protecting
the privacy-related interests of their patrons in their online health information recommendations.

Background
Behavioural Tracking and Privacy
It has long been recognized that Internet users face privacy risks as they navigate online
spaces. Historically, these privacy concerns have focused on the collection, use, and retention of
personally identifying information (PII) that is explicitly provided by users in the course of online
activities (e.g., registration information that includes name, email, etc.). More recently, however,
websites and associated advertisers have increased their use of behavioural tracking measures
that collect non-personally identifying information (NPII) that cannot be associated with a
specific identifiable individual, including IP address, browser configuration information, and
details of browsing behaviour (Soltani et al., 2009; McDonald & Cranor, 2010; Ayenson et al.,
2011; Chester, 2012).
Behavioural tracking is often justified as a tool that supports positive outcomes such as
website personalization and targeted advertising that delivers information on products and
services that are of interest to the user. The information gathered through this tracking, however,
can also be used to discriminate against consumers through activities such as price discrimination
or even denial of service (e.g., insurance applications; Center for Digital Democracy et al., 2009;
Castelluccia & Narayanan, 2012). The detailed personal profile that can be developed on the
basis of behavioural tracking, especially when that information is integrated across multiple visits
and/or multiple websites, is of potential interest to employers, insurers, and providers of financial
2

services — in fact, to anyone who would derive value from the segmentation of Internet users
according to their online behaviour and characteristics inferred on the basis of that behaviour
(Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013). Privacy threats associated with this profiling are
particularly acute in the context of health information, since the searches that individuals conduct
can reveal sensitive and potentially damaging information regarding health-related concerns and
interests (Anderson-Inman & Horney, 1998; Berger, Wagner & Baker, 2005; Cline & Haynes
2001).
Various privacy guidelines have been proposed for the collection, retention and use of
personal information in the online environment (e.g., the Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, developed by the Council of
Europe, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data). Arguably foremost among these
is the set of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPs) proposed in 1973 by The US Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems. FIPs and other guidelines are not
themselves enforceable, but these principles form the basis of legally enforceable regulatory
frameworks including the European Commission Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC)
and Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).
It is important to recognize that regulatory frameworks did not originally contemplate the
collection of NPII, and were focused solely on the regulation of the collection and use of
personally identifiable information. Regulatory bodies have noted this problem, and are
beginning to respond. The European Data Protection Directive, for example, has recently been
extended to cover any information that a website causes to be stored in a users’ browser (thereby
covering some if not all forms of NPII; 2009 EU directive 2009/136/EC). The OPC has recently
developed guidelines2 and a policy position3 on online behavioural advertising that address the
application of PIPEDA to the collection and use of NPII in the context of online behavioural
advertising. The guidelines and policy position extend PIPEDA coverage to at least some NPII
through the argument that this information can be personally identifying, requiring opt-in consent
for collection and use of sensitive information, and opt-out or implied consent for information
that is less sensitive. These advances achieve the positive outcome of increasing the reach of
2
3

https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2011/gl_ba_1112_e.pdf
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2012/bg_ba_1206_e.asp
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legislative regulatory frameworks with respect to online behavioural tracking. At the same time,
enforcement is challenging and thus uneven, given that is typically reliant on consumer complaint
to identify breaches. Moreover, unless the regulations require opt-in consent, users may remain
unaware of behavioural tracking, since many will fail to read privacy policies that provide
disclosure for opt-out consent (Milne et al., 2004; Vila et al., 2003).
Increasingly, consumers are seeking health information online (Fox, 2011; Statistics
Canada, 2011), revealing in the process potentially sensitive information about their health status,
health concerns, and health-related activities. It is important, therefore, that we understand the
behavioural tracking practices of the consumer health websites used by consumers, in order to
develop educational interventions and other strategies that will help to ensure consumer privacy
with respect to this type of health information.
Consumer Health Information
Consumer interest in health information has been increasing in response to a movement
toward patient participation in health care decisions (Entwistle, 2000, Holmes et al., 2005,
Coulter, 1997, Gafni et al., 1999) and sociocultural changes including the general consumer
movement and women’s health movements of the mid to late 1990s (Marshall, 1992). Health
information is and has been available through a variety of sources, including health care
professionals, family and friends, and various forms of media (Hesse et al, 2005). Increasingly,
however, consumers are seeking this information online, and searches for health information are
among the most common of online activities. The latest iteration of the Canadian Internet Use
Survey, for example, indicates that 69.9% of Canadians who use Internet at home search for
medical or health related information, making it one of the most widespread online activities,
ranking above paying bills online (Statistics Canada, 2011).
The proliferation of health information on the Internet has certainly brought many positive
outcomes. Even though consumers report that their preferred source of health information is a
health professional (Hesse et al., 2005), they often consider that the information they receive
from these professionals is insufficient (Coulter, Entwistle and Gilbert, 1999; Chen and Siu,
2001; Saver et al., 2007). In this context, access to online health information increases
consumers’ health knowledge, such as their understanding of the risks and benefits of treatment,
and enables them to make more informed decisions (Coulter, 2006; Coulter et al., 2006). For
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consumers, the Internet also improves anonymous access to information on stigmatized
conditions or issues such as mental illness or sexual health (Anderson-Inman and Horney, 1998;
Cline and Haynes, 2001; Berger, Wagner and Baker, 2005).
At the same time, online health information presents risks to consumers. There are the
obvious risks associated with inaccurate or misleading information, particularly acute because
consumers use health information to make important decisions (Fox and Rainie, 2002). Of
particular relevance in the current context is that fact that consumers seeking health information
online are also subject to the privacy risks associated with the collection of personal information
and behavioural tracking data (Soltani et al., 2009; McDonald and Cranor, 2010; Ayenson et al.,
2011; Chester, 2012), and the often sensitive nature of health information seeking serves only to
heighten the potential negative consequences. Many Internet users are unaware of behavioural
tracking, and even those who are familiar with the issue may not fully understand the range and
power of behavioural tracking mechanisms (McDonald and Cranor, 2010). Given this
background, online health information seeking creates a ‘perfect storm’ of privacy concern for
Canadians.
Digital Literacy and the Role of Information Professionals
Librarians are and have long been important intermediaries in the search for health
information (Lunin, 1987; Marshall et al., 1991; Murray, 2008; Rees, 1991; Rubenstein, 2012),
and health related questions are common at library reference desks (Marshall et al., 1991; Wood
et al., 2000). In the past, information professionals have directed patrons to print sources for
health information. Increasingly, however, the best and most up-to-date health information is
available on the Internet, and this shift has brought about attendant changes in the role of
information professionals with respect to this important aspect of information practice. In
particular, information professionals are now directing patrons to online health information
resources, and at the same time taking up the new responsibility of assisting their patrons to
identify on their own the best possible online resources. As a result, these professionals are faced
on two fronts with fundamental issues of digital literacy: first, information professionals must
themselves have the skills and expertise necessary to select the best possible online resources;
second, they must support their patrons in developing those same skills.

5

One digital literacy issue that is increasingly significant for information professionals is
that of user privacy, not only with respect to library practices regarding the collection and use of
personal information (Burkell and Carey, 2011), but also with respect to the privacy challenges
associated with the resources that consumers access online. Protecting users’ privacy is very
important to librarians, and the issue is identified in the code of ethics of many library
associations (e.g., Canadian Library Association, 1976). Librarians, from the earliest days of
internet-based health resources, have worked to overcome barriers preventing consumers to make
effective use of online health information (Cline and Haynes, 2001). They advise consumers who
look online for health information to evaluate it with respect to factors such as intended audience,
sponsorship, and information accuracy, currency and completeness (Fox and Rainie, 2002;
Medical Library Association, n.d.). In helping users find good health information online,
librarians have long advised them to pay attention to whether a health website includes
advertisements (Medical Library Association, n.d.). These concerns about advertising are
typically tied to the balance, coverage and objectivity of the information delivered on the site.
More rarely, librarians advise users to read privacy policies for disclosure of collection and use of
PII (e.g. MedlinePlus, n.d.). To date, however, information literacy guidelines have not addressed
the privacy risks associated with behavioural tracking (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, 2011; 2012).
As information professionals responsible for promoting the information literacy of the
public, librarians should be aware that advertisers, using powerful data collection and profiling
apparatus, can form a rich and nuanced portrait of Internet users — without the collection of any
identifying information. This requires an understanding of behavioural tracking mechanisms and
strategies, including “data optimization, ‘self-tuning’ algorithms, ‘intent’ data and ‘immersive’
multimedia” (Chester, 2012) that leverage information collected through cookies and beacons. In
particular, information professionals should understand that user activity can be tracked across
multiple websites, linking key aspects of Internet users’ digital identities into a comprehensive
user profile. This understanding will support identification of privacy-respecting internet
resources for recommendation to patrons, and also support digital literacy initiatives that will
assist patrons in identifying privacy threats in the information they access online.

6

Behavioural Tracking Mechanisms
Mechanisms for tracking a user’s activities online—and worries about potential privacy
breaches they can allow—are not new. At their inception, HTTP cookies (cookies), which were
originally introduced by Netscape in its Navigator 1.1 in the mid 1990s, were generating
controversy about the potential invasion of privacy (Randall, 1997). HTTP cookies, however, are
relatively easy for users to manage using accessible browser settings that limit or even entirely
disallow the practice of setting cookies. As a result, websites, advertisers and others who benefit
from web audience segmentation and behaviour analytics now deploy these mechanisms along
with newer and more obscure tracking technologies including ‘supercookies’ and web beacons
(Sipior, Ward and Mendoza, 2011). Cookies can be set by directly by the website (first-party
cookies) or by advertising companies through ads embedded in first-party sites (third-party
cookies). ‘Supercookies’ and web beacons, similarly, can be first-party or third-party
mechanisms. First-party tracking mechanisms collect information about a site visit and visitor
and deliver that information to the site itself. Using first-party tracking, web sites can provide
personalized interaction, integrating visit and visitor information both within a single visit and
across multiple visits. This information, however, is only available to the web site itself, and thus
neither includes information about visits to other sites nor is accessible by other websites. Thirdparty tracking mechanisms, by contrast, deliver information about a site visit and visitor to a third
party, often an advertising company. Third-party tracking represents a greater menace to privacy,
since third parties have a presence on multiple sites, and are able to collect information about
users and their activities on all those sites and integrate that information across sites and across
visits into a single detailed user profile (McDonald and Cranor ,2010).
HTTP Cookies
HTTP cookies (also known as browser cookies) were originally meant to help web
developers gather information about users in order to personalize and optimize user experience
(Randall, 1997). These cookies are simply a few lines of text shared in an HTTP transaction, and
a typical cookie might include a user ID, the time of a visit, and the IP address of the computer.
Cookies do not usually include identifying information such as name or address, and they are
able to do so if an only if the user has explicitly provided this information to the website. When
users want to access a web page, their browser sends a request to the server for the specific
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website and the server searches the hard drive for a cookie file from this site. If there is no
cookie, a unique identifier code is assigned to the browser and a cookie file is saved on the hard
drive. If there is a cookie, the browser transfers the cookie file contents back to that site using the
previously recorded identifier code (Harding, Reed and Gray, 2007).
HTTP cookies can record visited pages, a user’s chosen values and all mouse-clicking
choices. They also provide the server with information such as a user’s IP address, service
provider, operating system and browser type (Harding, Reed and Gray, 2007). They enhance the
experience of users in many ways and make the browsing experience more efficient. HTTP
cookies can record the preferences of users on a web page and enable them to resume interaction
with a website at the point where they were on the previous visit, which is the basis of site
personalization. Using the IP address of a user, for instance, HTTP cookies can allow a website to
display information relevant to the geographic area where a user is located. HTTP cookies also
allow a website to remember registration details and the content users have put in their shopping
basket (Harding, Reed and Gray, 2007). HTTP cookies inform webmasters of users’ movements
on their websites: what pages are visited, how often they are visited, and in what order. They can
also indicate the common entry and exit points for a specific website, information that can be
used to increase user satisfaction and traffic. This information has obvious value for website
optimization and personalization. At the same time, however, the detailed profile of user
activities, potentially aggregated over multiple visits, presents potential privacy risks. The
information stored in HTTP cookies can allow a website to know what topics or products are of
particular interest for a user, and identify browsing and information access habits.
Some HTTP cookies, called session or transient cookies, automatically expire at the end
of a session. They are mainly used to keep track of what a consumer has added to a shopping cart
or to allow users to navigate on a website without having to log in repeatedly. Other HTTP
cookies, called permanent, persistent or stored cookies, are configured to keep track of users until
the cookie reaches its expiration date, which be set many years after creation. Permanent HTTP
cookies can be easily deleted using browser management tools (Sipior, Ward and Mendoza,
2011). Studies have shown that over 30 percent of users delete cookies once a month (e.g
Marshal, 2005). Such behaviour, however, displeases advertisers, as it leads to an overestimation
of the number of true unique visitors on a website and impede user tracking (Abraham,
Meierhoefer and Lipsman, 2007).
8

Local Shared Objects
To palliate this ‘attack’ on HTTP cookies, an online advertising company, United
Virtualities, developed a backup system for cookies: local shared objects (also known as Flash
cookies), now a feature of Adobe’s Flash Player plug-in (Soltani et al., 2009). Unlike HTTP
cookies, Flash cookies do not have an expiration date. They are also not handled by a browser,
but are stored in a location accessible to different browsers and Flash widgets, which are thus all
able to access the same cookie. Flash cookies represent a more resilient technology for tracking
than HTTP cookies, and erasing traditional cookies within a browser does not affect Flash
cookies (Soltani et al., 2009). Moreover, Flash cookies have the ability to ‘respawn’ (or recreate)
deleted HTTP cookies, and a website using Flash cookies can therefore track users across
sessions even if the user has taken reasonable steps to avoid this type of online profiling
(Ayenson et al., 2011).
Web Beacons
Users’ online behaviour can also be monitored by beacons (also called web beacons or
web bugs), which tiny are image tags embedded within the coding of a document placed on a
website or an e-mail (Martin, Wu and Alsaid, 2003). The image tag creates a holding space for a
referenced image residing on the Web, and beacons transmit information to a remote computer
when the page is viewed. As with cookies, beacons can also be first- or third party (McDonald
and Cranor, 2010). Unlike cookies, beacons are not tied to a specific server and, in the case of
third-party beacons, can track users over multiple web sites (Schoen, 2009). User interaction on
the web page, such as typed entries and mouse movement, can be tracked directly using beacons,
and web beacons can also be retrieve information from a previously set cookie (Angwin, 2010).
Such capacity means, according to the Privacy Foundation (2000), that beacons could potentially
transfer to a third-party demographic data and personally identifiable information (name, address,
phone number, email address, etc.) that a user has typed on a page.

Objectives
This research project seeks to document the tracking practices of consumer health
websites that Canadians are likely to encounter. It also explores the disclosure of the collection of
NPII in the privacy policies of these websites that engage in behavioural tracking.
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Plan of the Report
The first chapter analyzes the presence of behavioural tracking mechanisms on both
English language and French language consumer health websites, and the disclosure of these
practices on a subset of consumer health websites are documented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3
discusses strategies for detecting, mitigating, and neutralizing behavioural tracking. Chapter 4,
finally, describes the activities that we have undertaken to disseminate these results to the various
communities and presents future dissemination plans.

10

Chapter 1: Behavioural Tracking Practices
Introduction
In this chapter, we analyse the presence of behavioural tracking mechanisms on both
English language and French language consumer health websites. The analysis of the English
language websites contrasts websites recommended by health librarians to those retrieved using
Google searches for the ten most commonly searched conditions on the Internet. In the absence
of a recommended list of consumer health websites in French, the analysis of French language
websites does not include this contrast. Instead, for the French language websites we report the
tracking detected on relevant websites retrieved using Google searches for the ten most
commonly searched conditions on the Internet.

1.1 Methodology
1.1.1 Sampling of the Websites
For the English language websites, two sets of consumer health websites were identified:
1.

The consolidated set of websites recommended by the Consumer and Patient Health
Information Section (CAPHIS) of the American Medical Library Association (2010)
and the Consumer Health Information Providers Interest Group (CHIPIG) of the
Canadian Health Libraries Association (2010; see Appendix I for a full list);

2.

The consolidated set of websites returned on the first two pages of Google searches of
the ten most commonly searched conditions, as identified by the Pew Research
Center’s Internet & American Life Project (Fox, 2011; see Table 1 for a list of these
conditions).

Obviously irrelevant results (e.g., sites for roofing companies that were returned for the ‘shingles’
search) were eliminated from the Google results, as were any sites that were included on the
consolidated ‘recommended’ list. The Google searches were repeated three times using a
different computer each time. The complete list of ‘Google Only’ websites used for the analysis
can be found in Appendix II.
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For the French language websites, in the absence of a recommended list of consumer
health websites, the websites examined included the consolidated set of websites returned on the
first two pages of Google searches of the ten most commonly searched conditions as identified by
the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project (Fox, 2011). The ten conditions
identified in that report were translated into French by the second author for the purposes of
searching (see Table 1). Obviously irrelevant results (e.g., kijiji.ca was returned in a search for
‘vésicule biliaire’) were eliminated from the results. The Google searches were repeated three
times using a different computer each time, and all relevant returned websites were recorded. The
complete consolidated list of websites used for the analysis can be found in Appendix III.
Table 1
The Ten Most Commonly Searched Conditions on the Internet (Fox 2011)
Original conditions

French translation

Shingles
Gallbladder
Gout
Hemorrhoids
Lupus
Skin problems
Allergies
Heart disease
Diabetes
Sleep disorders

Zona
Vésicule biliaire
Goutte
Hémorroïdes
Lupus
Problèmes de peau
Allergies
Maladie cardiaque
Diabète
Problèmes de sommeil

1.1.2 Data Collection and Analysis
The data for each website (Recommended, Google Only, and French language) was
collected separately, following a protocol that was developed to avoid any contamination of
tracking results between the websites. Each website was visited in an independent session. Each
session began with the browser at an about:blank page, with clean data directories (no HTTP and
Flash cookies, and an empty cache). The website was then accessed directly by entering the
domain name into the browser’s navigation bar. A typical user interaction with the website was
mimicked by visiting approximately 10 pages on the site. Search functions on the site were used
and any surveys that did not ask for personal information were completed (e.g., ‘Question of the
day’ surveys). We did not click through on any ads or follow any external links; thus, user
interaction was confined to the website in question.
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At the end of the session, HTTP cookies in the browser cookie file were recorded along
with any flash cookies stored in Adobe’s Website Storage Settings panel. These results were
augmented by those returned by Ghostery4, a browser extension that records web beacons, and
Charles5, an application that captures and analyzes data being sent between the browser and the
visited website, and between the browser and third-party sites. Using these sources, we created a
comprehensive list of the tracking mechanisms present on the site and the domains from which
these trackers originated. After these data were recorded, the browser cache was cleared, all
HTTP cookies were removed and the flash cookie folder was emptied using Adobe’s Website
Storage Settings panel, in preparation for a new data collection session. In a separate session,
each website was visited to identify a privacy policy; if a privacy policy was located, it was saved
for later analysis.
Once all data collection was complete, we created a consolidated list of third party
tracking domains identified on all websites. Using a combination of results from Ghostery and
PrivacyChoice6, we assigned each domain to one of two categories: third-party analytics, or thirdparty advertisers7. The results provide an overview of third-party tracking presence on these
consumer health websites, with additional separate focus on third-party advertising, since it is
these trackers that create the greatest privacy risk. For the purpose of the analysis, we also
divided websites into three categories: Government, Not-for-Profit (e.g., Alzheimer’s society)
and Other (usually commercial sites).

1.2 Results for English Language Websites
The recommended lists from CAPHIS and CHIPIG yielded a total of 83 distinct consumer
health information sites. The first two pages of the Google searches for the ten most commonly
searched conditions yielded a total of 81 relevant websites that did not also appear on the
recommended list.

4

https://www.ghostery.com
http://www.charlesproxy.com
6
www.privacychoice.org/trackerlist
7
We recognize that this determination is not always clearcut. For example, the distinction between third-party
analytics companies and third-party advertisers is not always absolute (e.g., PrivacyChoice identifies Dataium as
both an ad network and an analytics company). In general, for those cases where a domain undertook both types of
activities, we identified it as an analytics rather than advertising domain, in order not to over-estimate the prevalence
of third party advertising.
5
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Third party behavioural tracking mechanisms were identified in the large majority of
websites. Overall, 87% of the English language consumer health information websites included
in the two samples had third party trackers, representing an average of 10 different domains for
each site. Over half of the sites had trackers from third party advertisers, on average from 2
different domains. Across all sites we identified trackers from a total of 230 different tracking
domains, of which 23 were identified as advertisers (see Appendix IV for a list of all tracking
domains identified in the website scans).
1.2.1 Recommended vs. Google Only Sites
Table 2 identifies the tracking domains that appear on more than 25% of all websites,
indicating separately the presence of trackers from these domains on Recommended and Google
Only sites. There was no difference between Recommended and Google Only sites with respect
to the presence of third party tracking (X2(1)=0.3, n.s.). Among the 83 Recommended websites,
86.7% (n=72) were associated with at least one tracking domain, compared to 87.7% (n=71) of
the Google Only sites. Recommended sites, however, were significantly less likely to have third
party advertisers: 41% (n=34) of Recommended sites had at least one third-party advertiser,
compared to 61.7% (n=50) of Google Only sites (X2(1)=7.13, p<.01). We also examined the
number of different domains represented on sites that had trackers present. Among those sites
with third-party trackers, Recommended sites had trackers from an average of 13.1 domains, and
Google Only sites had trackers from an average of 17.2 domains. The difference, however, only
approached but did not reach significance (t(141)=1.82, p=.071). Among those sites with thirdparty advertisers, Recommended sites had trackers from an average of 4.8 different domains,
while Google Only sites had trackers from an average of 5.3 different domains. The difference
was not significant (t(82)=4.89, n.s.). These results demonstrate that third party tracking on
consumer health websites is widespread, and that Recommended websites show similar levels of
tracking to Google Only sites, although the presence of third-party advertisers (as compared to all
third party trackers) is lower on Recommended sites.
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Table 2
Common Tracking Domains (on more than 25% of sites)
Cookie / Beacon
Third Party Trackers (All)
Google Analytics
Facebook
AddThis
ScorecardReesarch
Third Party Advertising
DoubleClick
Microsoft Atlas Solutions
Google Adsense

Number in Recommended sites
(% of sites)

Number in ‘Google Only’ sites
(% of sites)

60 (72.3%)
27 (32.5%)
29 (34.9%)
23 (27.7%)

48 (59.3%)
30 (37.0%)
21 (25.9%)
26 (32.1%)

21 (25.3%)
20 (24.1%)
11 (13.3%)

38 (46.9%)
24 (29.6%)
31 (38.3%)

1.2.3 Government, Not-for-Profit, and Other Sites
Considering all of the sites (Recommended and Google Only) in the sample, 18.3%
(n=30) are Government sites, 32.3% (n=53) are Not-for-Profit sites, and 49.4% (n=81) are Other
sites. When Recommended and Google Only sites are considered separately, significant
differences emerge between the two groups (X2(2)=29.9, p<.001): among Recommended sites,
30.1% (n=25) are Government sites, 39.8% (n=33) are Not-for-Profit sites, and 30.1% (n=25) are
Other sites; among Google Only sites, 6.2% (n=5) are Government sites, 24.7% (n=20) are Notfor-Profit sites, and 69.1% (n=56) are Other sites. Thus, other (including commercial) sites are far
less likely to be included among those recommended by Library and Information science
professionals compared to those returned by a Google search.
Among the Government sites, 83.3% (n=25) have at least one tracker, compared to 86.8%
(n=46) of the Not-for-Profit sites, and 88.9% (n=72) of the Other sites. Across the three groups,
there is no significant difference in the presence of trackers (X2(2)=0.173, n.s.). The picture is
quite different, however, when only advertising trackers are considered. Among Government
sites, only 3.3% (n=1) had this type of tracker, compared to 49.1% (n=26) of Not-for-Profit sites,
and 70.4% (n=57) of Other sites. The difference across types was significant (X2(2)=8.543,
p<.001). The number of trackers present was compared across Government (average of 3.6), Notfor-Profit (average of 6.4) and Other sites (average of 18.0); revealing a significant effect
(F(2,140)=14.6, p<.001). Post-hoc tests (Tukey’s) revealed that Other sites have significantly more
third-party trackers than either Government or Not-for-Profit sites, which do not differ from each
other. We also compared the number of different advertising trackers present on Not-for-Profit
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and Other sites (Government sites were eliminated from this analysis because only one had any
advertising trackers). Among those sites with at least one advertising tracker, Not-for-Profit sites
had an average of 2.8 advertising trackers, compared to 6.2 for Other sites; the difference is
significant (t(81)=3,41, p<.01). Thus, Government sites have fewer third-party trackers than do
Not-for-Profit and Other sites, which do not differ significantly from each other. Other sites also
have significantly more third-party advertisers present on their sites than do websites Not-forProfit agencies.

1.3 Results for French Language Websites
The first two pages of the Google searches for the ten most commonly searched
conditions yielded a total of 195 relevant French language websites. The presence of behavioural
tracking was identified in the large majority of websites. Overall, 91% (n=179) of the consumer
health websites included in the sample had third party trackers, representing an average of 13
different domains for each site. Forty percent (n=78) of the sites had trackers from third party
advertisers, on average from 2.4 different domains. Across all sites we identified trackers from a
total of 251 different tracking domains, of which 25 were advertisers (see Appendix IV for a list
of all tracking domains identified in the website scans).
Among the French language websites, 17.1% (n=33) were Government sites, 20.2%
(n=39) were Not-for-Profit sites, and 62.7% (n=121) were Other sites. When looking at the
presence of third-party trackers, significant differences were present across the three categories
(X2(2)=16.909, p<.001). Results indicate that Other websites (including commercial) are more
likely to contain third party trackers (75.8% (n=25) of Government sites have third-party trackers
compared to 84.6% (n=33) of Not-for-Profit sites and 97.5% (n=118) of other sites). The number
of trackers present was compared across Government (average of 2.3), Not-for-Profit (average of
6.0) and Other sites (average of 18.2). The difference was significant (F(2,173)=11.396, p<.001),
and post-hoc tests (Tukey’s) indicate that other sites have significantly more third-party tracking
domains than do either Government or Not-for-Profit sites, which do not differ from each other.
Significant differences were also be found when looking at the presence of advertisers
(X2(2)=43.251 p<.001): among Government sites 3% (n=1) have advertising trackers, compared to
17.9% (n=7) of Not-for-Profit sites and 53.7% (n=65) Other sites. We contrasted the number of
advertisers present on Not-for-Profit and Other sites (government sites were eliminated because
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only one had any tracking by third-party advertisers). The results indicate that Other sites have
significantly more third-party advertisers (7.0) than do Not-for-Profit websites (3.57;
t(9.905)=2.858, p<.058). Table 3 identifies the tracking domains that appear on more than 25% of
all websites, and identifies the proportion of French language websites that have trackers from
each of these domains. Overall, the results for French language sites mirror those for English
language sites: third party tracking is widespread, occurring on the vast majority of sites.
Tracking by third-party advertisers, while less prevalent, is still common. Commercial sites show
the highest levels of tracking by third-party advertisers.

Table 3
Common Tracking Domains (on more than 25% of sites)
Cookie / Beacon
Third Party Trackers (All)
AddThis
Facebook
Google +1
Media6Degrees
Twitter
Third Party Advertising
DoubleClick
Google Adsense

Number (% of sites)
56 (28.7%)
93 (47.7%)
61 (31.3 %)
55 (28.2%)
58 (29.7%)
69 (35.4%)
57 (29.2%)

Conclusion
The results of this research demonstrate that third-party behavioural tracking is present on
the large majority (at least 4 out of 5) of English and French language consumer health websites,
and almost half of consumer health websites have trackers from third-party advertisers (50% of
English sites, 40% of French sites). Furthermore, the English language websites recommended by
library associations are not significantly better with respect to third party tracking, although these
sites do show lower levels of tracking by third-party advertisers. Government sites (both French
and English) show high levels of third party tracking (4 out of 5 English government sites and 3
out of 4 French government sites), but they are much less likely to include trackers by third-party
advertisers (less than 5% of both French and English language government sites have one or
more advertising trackers). ‘Other’ (primarily commercial) sites show the highest levels of third-

8

Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant (F=4.084, p<.05, so equal variances were not assumed).
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party trackers (well over 4 out of 5 French language and English language sites in this category
have at least one third-party tracker) and they are most likely to include trackers from third-party
advertisers (over half French language and English language sites in this category have trackers
from at least one third-party advertiser). Thus, government consumer health websites are
relatively free from tracking by third-party advertisers, but ‘other’ sites show relatively high
levels of this type of tracking, with not-for-profit sites falling in between these two categories.
It is evident from these results that consumers seeking health information on the Internet
are very likely to be subject to third-party tracking of their health information seeking behaviours.
It is important, therefore, to examine privacy policies to determine whether a consumer could
effectively learn, from reading those policies, about the tracking activities present on the websites
they visit.
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Chapter 2: Disclosure of Behavioural Tracking in Privacy Policies
Introduction
There exist, as discussed in the introduction, a variety of privacy guidelines have
regulating the collection, retention and use of personal information in the online environment.
One important aspect of these regulatory frameworks is the requirement for notice: users should
be given notice of website practices with respect to the collection and use of personal
information. This notice is typically provided in privacy policies that identify what information is
collected, how it is used, and with whom it is shared.
In general, regulatory frameworks did not originally contemplate the collection of NPII,
and instead were focused on the regulation of the collection and use of personally identifiable
information. Although there is no explicit and universal requirement that users be apprised of the
collection and use of NPII, such a provision would seem to be consistent with FIPs and other
guidelines, and in the US new Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Online Behavioral Advertising
identify the need to provide notice to users when behavioural data is collected that allows the
tracking of users across websites and over time (United States Federal Trade Commission, 2009).
Indeed, within the Self-Regulatory Guidelines it is noted that with changes in technology and
increasingly powerful data analytic techniques the distinction between PII and NPII becomes
“less and less meaningful and should not, by itself, determine the protections provided for
consumer data.” (United States Federal Trade Commission, 2009, p. 21-22). The Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada has also determined that PIPEDA protections extend in at least
some circumstances to NPII, therefore requiring notice of these data collection practices in at
least some circumstances. Thus, there seems to be general agreement that users should be
informed of behavioural tracking measures active on the websites they visit.
Website privacy policies are often difficult to understand (Micheti, Burkell, & Steeves,
2010), apparently written with the goal of protecting a website owner against lawsuits rather than
informing users (Earp et al. 2005; Pollach, 2005). Pollach (2005), for example, details a variety
of linguistic strategies that serve to undermine user understanding of website practices, including
mitigation and enhancement, obfuscation of reality, relationship building, and persuasive appeals.
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Thus, it is legitimate and indeed important to examine whether the privacy policies of websites
engaged in behavioural tracking effectively disclose these practices, particularly in the case of
websites recommended by library and information science professionals.
In this chapter, we analyse disclosure of behavioural tracking practices on a subset of
consumer health information websites. For the English language websites, these sites represent a
purposive sample of the recommended sites: third party trackers were observed on all selected
sites, and the set includes government and commercial sources, encompassing sites with
relatively low levels of tracking (e.g., Mayo Clinic), as well as those with much higher levels
(e.g., What to Expect; see Burkell and Fortier, 2013). For the French language sites, these sites
represent the French language versions of the two sites that were recommended in the English
language recommended lists and also appeared in the Google results (Cancer.ca and
PasseportSante.net) plus four other websites purposively selected for the presence of third party
trackers. These include not-for-profit and commercial sources and encompass sites with relatively
low levels of tracking (e.g., FmCoeur.qc.ca), as well as sites with much higher levels of tracking
(e.g., Vulgaris-Medical.com).

2.1 Methodology
Seven English language websites and six French language websites were selected (see
Tables 4 and 5). Their privacy policies were examined qualitatively for disclosure of first- and
third-party tracking mechanisms and NPII data collection. The analysis draws on the critical
linguistics approach used by Pollach (2005), particularly focusing on linguistic strategies used for
mitigation and enhancement and obfuscation of reality. These include the use of:
•

Qualitative adjectives that emphasize or de-emphasize specific qualities;

•

Temporal adverbs (e.g., ‘occasionally’ or ‘occasionnellement’) that downplay frequency;

•

Conditional verbs (e.g., ‘may’ or ‘pourrait’) or structures that introduce uncertainty;

•

Nominalizations (e.g., ‘the collection of data’ or ‘la collecte de données’) and the passive
voice (e.g., ‘data are collected’ or ‘les données sont collectées’) that obscure agency.
Tables 4 and 5 present the websites selected for the analysis along with a summary of

tracking mechanisms found on these websites.
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Table 4
English Language Websites Used the Analysis of Privacy Policies
Website

Number of first party cookies

WhatToExpect.com

17
(6 sessional, 11 persistent, valid for
up to 2 years)
18
(13 sessional, 6 persistent, valid for
up to 17 years, 1 flash cookie)
7
(2 sessional, 5 persistent, valid for up
to 2 years)
11
(4 sessional, 9 persistent, valid for up
to 30 years)
18
(9 sessional, 9 persistent, valid up to
5 years)
8
(6 sessional, 2 persistent, valid for up
to 15 years)
4
(1 sessional, 3 persistent, valid for up
to 2 years)

MedicineNet.com
HealthyWoman.org
MayoClinic.com
FamilyDoctor.org
MedHelp.org
Feminist.com

Number of
beacons

Number of third party cookies
119
(most persistent, valid for up to 33
years)
118
(most persistent, valid for up to 3
years)
42
(all persistent, valid for up to 2
years)
40
(all persistent, valid for up to 2
years)
36
(all persistent, valid for up to 2
years)
14
(all persistent, valid for up to 2
years)
13
(all persistent, valid for up to 6
months)

40
37
12
9
15
10
5

Table 5
French Language Websites Used in the Analysis of Privacy Policies
Website
PasseportSante.net
VulgarisMedical.com
TopSante.com
InfoBebes.com
FmCoeur.qc.ca
Cancer.ca

Number of first party cookies
8
(4 sessional, 4 persistent, valid for
up to 2 years)
11
(2 sessional, 9 persistent, valid for
up to 10 years)
15
(3 sessional, 12 persistent, valid for
up to 2 years)
10
(1 sessional, 9 persistent, valid for
up to 2 years)
21
(16 sessional, 5 persistent, valid up
to 6 years)
11
(5 sessional, 6 persistent, valid for
up to 2 years)
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Number of third party cookies
115
(most persistent, valid for up to 10
years)
262
(most persistent, valid for up to 10
years)
91
(most persistent, valid for up to 10
years)
218
(most persistent, valid for up to 30
years)
46
(most persistent, valid for up to 14
years)
55
(most persistent, valid for up to 5
years)

Number of
beacons
51
96
66
75
24
22

2.2 Results for English language websites
Each of the selected websites sets first-party cookies, both sessional (i.e. deleted when the
browser is closed) and persistent (stored on a user’s hard drive until its expiration date). The
minimum number of first-party cookies observed was 4 (Feminist.com), and the maximum
number was 18 (medicine.net and FamilyDoctor.org). Each website had at least one persistent
first party cookie that lasted for 2 years or longer, and one site (MayoClinic.com) set a persistent
first party cookie that lasted for 30 years. In addition, the seven selected health information sites
set between 119 (WhatToExpect.com) and 13 (Feminist.com) third party cookies, and included
between 40 (WhatToExpect.com) and 5 (Feminist.com) beacons. At least one advertiser
(DoubleClick, AddThis, etc.) was included among the third parties present on each of the sites.
Thus, we know that at every one of the selected sites users are subject to first party behavioural
tracking as well as third party tracking by various entities including advertising agencies using
both cookies and web beacons to monitor user behaviour.
2.2.1 Analysis of Privacy Policies
We analyzed the privacy policies of each of the seven websites for disclosure regarding
behavioural tracking practices. One site (Feminist.com) had a very short ‘privacy’ policy (less
than one page) that did not actually address any privacy issues. In our testing, this website
showed the lowest level of behavioural tracking among the seven selected sites (see Table 1).
Nonetheless, there was plenty to disclose, since this website does participate in third party
behavioural tracking, setting first party cookies that persist for up to 2 years, and third party
cookies that persist for up to six months. It is therefore notable that they make no attempt to
disclose this behavioural tracking in their privacy policy. The remainder of this analysis
addresses the six policies that included some discussion of privacy issues.
2.2.2 Notice of NPII Collection
We first examined each of the remaining privacy policies for explicit discussion of the
collection of NPII, using the keywords ‘collect’, ‘gather’, or ‘log’. Each of the six policies had
some direct mention of first party collection of NPII, while five of the six policies explicitly
discussed third party collection of this type of information.
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In some cases, disclosures about first-party collection of NPII are explicit and easy to
follow. FamilyDoctor.org (AAFP) has a particularly clear disclosure, identifying that they collect
NPII, and telling the user what information this entails. This list appears early in the privacy
policy under the heading ‘What information does the AAFP collect?’:
The following information is collected from all visitors to AAFP Web
sites and is recorded in a log file:
• Time and date of the visit
• The Internet address of the computer
• The browser and operating system used
• The page that is viewed
• The previous page that was visited
Note the use of the third person (‘What information does the AAFP collect?’) and the passive
voice; these linguistic strategies serve to reduce the perceived agency of the website with respect
to NPII collection.
Among the remaining sites, WhatToExpect.com provides the clearest disclosure, but the
indication of what information is collected is scattered throughout the privacy policy and is cast
in conditional language. Under the heading ‘Information we collect through your use of the Site’,
the privacy policy includes the following:
As you use the Site and Services, certain information may also be
passively collected. Through cookies, pixels, beacons, log files and other
technologies, we may collect information about how you use the Site and
the Services. For example we may determine through an IP address that a
particular computer or device is located in New York City and we may
use this information to deliver advertisements promoting New York Citybased businesses.
The user is then directed to another part of the policy (‘Cookies and Targeted Advertising’) for
further information. Under that heading, this text appears:
We may … gather information regarding the date and time of your visit,
the features and information for which you searched and viewed, the
email you opened, or on which advertisements you clicked.
The other sites provide less detailed disclosure about this type of first party data
collection. The Mayo clinic, for example, acknowledges that they ‘collect and log the Internet
Protocol address (IP) of all visitors to MayoClinic.com’, following later with the information that
they use cookies to ‘provide us with information relating to the sources of our site traffic’.
MedHelp.org similarly indicates that they collect non-personal information ‘about your use of our
website and your use of the Web sites of selected sponsors and advertisers’. MedicineNet.com
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indicates that they ‘may collect “Non-Personal Information”’— information that cannot be used
to identify you’, and later in the policy they state that they ‘collect Non-Personal Information
about your use of the WebMD Web Sites and your use of other web sites…’. HealthyWoman.org
also explicitly acknowledges the collection of IP addresses, and they later acknowledge that they
‘may collect’ information about ‘your use of the Website’.
Not surprisingly, explicit disclosures of third party NPII collection were less frequent and
more limited, at least in part because (correctly) the sites indicate that they do not control the
practices of the third parties that are active (with permission, obviously) on their websites. At the
same time, it is critical to recall that the tracking measures we documented occurred in the
process of regular browsing on the sites: in particular, we did not ‘click through’ on any
advertisements or link to any outside sites. Thus, while the sites do not control the behaviour of
the third parties with respect to the NPII that is collected, they certainly control the presence of
those third parties on the website, and thus the ability of those third parties to collect personal
information.
Five of the six policies make at least some mention of third party NPII collection. Two of
these disclosures (MayoClinic.com and MedHelp.org) were quite detailed, providing the reader
with a list of the NPII collected by third parties, including browser type, operating system, Web
pages visited, time of visits, content viewed, ads viewed, and ‘other clickstream data’; while
MayoClinic.com indicates that third party advertisers collect this information, MedHelp.org notes
only that they may collect it. In another section, however, their policy indicates that MedHelp.org
‘receives’ (from where or whom is not indicated) NPII, including
your IP address, the URLs of sites from which you link to or leave our
website, your type of browser and ISP.
Under the heading ‘Information Collected by Third Party Advertisers’, WhatToExpect.com
includes the following:
‘Advertisers or other third parties on the Sites may also engage in
Behavioral Advertising and use cookies and web beacons in the manner
described above.’
One must infer that the ‘text above’ refers to this passage, appearing earlier in the document
under the heading ‘targeted advertising’:
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‘These third party vendors may connect information about pages you visit
on our Sites with information about pages you visit on other websites and
show you advertising based on this combined information.’
Note, however, that the verb used here is ‘connect’, leaving open the question of what data are
collected and by whom; moreover, conditional language is used once again to describe third party
collection (‘may also engage’).
In the privacy policies of two sites (FamilyDoctor.org, MedicineNet.com) disclosure
about third party NPII collection is limited to the assertion that collection is limited to NPII, or
that there is no collection of PII by third parties (without explicit acknowledgement that NPII is
collected by these third parties). No further details are provided in these cases.
We also examined the privacy policies for oblique disclosure of the collection of NPII
(first or third-party). In this case, we were looking for text in the privacy policy that provided to
the user an indication of the NPII that the website or third party had or used, without explicit
discussion of the actual collection of that information. Thus, in some cases a user could infer first
or third-party NPII collection through careful reading of the policy for these oblique references.
Although MayoClinic.com explicitly identifies only the collection of IP address (see above), they
acknowledge elsewhere in their policy the use (and therefore, necessarily, prior collection) of
additional NPII including ‘traffic patterns’, ‘site usage’, and ‘length of stay’. MedicineNet.com
acknowledges that they ‘statistically analyze user behaviour and activity including how
frequently areas of the site are visited’: from this, the user can surmise that MedicineNet.com
retains information about user visits that includes both the page(s) visited and the date of any
visit. Similarly, HealthyWoman.org indicates that cookies enable them ‘to track site navigation,
such as what sections users are visiting and how long they stay there’, while they explicitly
acknowledge only the collection of IP address.
There were relatively few oblique references to NPII collection by third parties.
MedHelp.org notes in their policy that “third-party advertisers can see the content of any page on
the MedHelp website, with the exception of Personal Health Records”, indicating that advertisers
‘target ads based on the content of those pages but do not store any personally identifiable
information.’ It is unclear from this passage whether NPII (including the page visited) is stored
by the advertisers, but it is evident that this information is at the very least used for contextual
advertising that is selected on the basis of the page the user is currently visiting.
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WhatToExpect.com acknowledges that third parties ‘may’ use cookies to understand ‘web usage
patterns’, but they leave it up to the user to infer the type of information that would be required to
support this understanding.
2.2.3 Notice of Behavioural Tracking Mechanisms
Each of the website privacy policies provides a definition of the term ‘cookie’; none,
however, includes an explicit discussion of web beacons. FamilyDoctor.org offers the most
comprehensive discussion:
Cookies are a technology used by the AAFP to identify a user as the user
moves through the AAFP Web sites. The user's browser allows the AAFP
to place some information on the user's hard drive that identifies the
computer utilized. Two types of cookies are commonly used. A session
cookie is a temporary file stored in memory on the user's computer drive
whenever a Web site is accessed and is terminated by closing the browser.
A persistent cookie is a file stored on the user's hard drive that may be
deleted manually by the user or expired by the Web server.
Three of the websites offer only a very brief definition, identifying cookies as ‘small data files’ or
‘small pieces of information’ that are stored or placed on the user’s computer. In each of these
three cases, a minimizing adjective is used to describe the information collected, suggesting that
this information (and therefore any privacy risk it entails) is negligible.
HealthyWoman.org provides a more detailed description, one that is inconsistent with the
description provided by the other sites:
When you logon to the Website, a cookie is generated on the server, or
the machine that hosts the site. The cookie is a randomly generated
number that does not include any of your Personal Information. This
randomly generated number or cookie remains on the server machine, not
on your computer, until you leave the site. When you visit the Website
again, a different, unique randomly generated number or cookie is
assigned.
This description includes some misleading or even factually inaccurate statements (e.g., the
‘cookie remains on the server machine’). Moreover, the emphasis on the ‘random’ nature of the
cookie, paired with the assertion that the cookie ‘does not include any of your Personal
Information’ suggests to the user that cookies have little if anything to do with them, yet nothing
could be further from the truth.
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All six of the privacy policies discuss the use of first party cookies for behavioural
tracking, most identifying the use of this information as a basis for improving user experience on
the website. This disclosure, on FamilyDoctor.org is typical (if a little more detailed than some):
The AAFP uses cookies on areas of its Web sites to personalize a
member's visit, to offer greater functionality, and to track visitor
practices. The information generated from these cookies is used to help
determine which services are most important and guide editorial
decisions.
MayoClinic.com notes that their practice is ‘like many websites’, while MedHelp.org as well as
HealthyWomen.org and WhatToExpect.com emphasize the benefits that users experience as a
result of the use of cookies. MedicineNet.com is the only website that conditionalizes their
disclosure regarding the use of first party cookies, noting that they ‘may collect non-personal
information… via cookies’; in another part of the policy, however, they indicate that they do
collect information (about the use of the website) through cookies. Interestingly,
WhatToExpect.com indicates that:
As you use the Site and Services, certain information may also be
passively collected.
This is a surprising (or perhaps inaccurate) use of language, since it is the provision of the
information, and not the collection, that is passive.
Four of the six policies acknowledge the use of third party cookies and web beacons on
their sites, although they use conditional language to describe these practices. These disclosures
run from the minimalist (WhatToExpect.com):
Advertisers or other third parties on the Sites may also engage in
Behavioral Advertising and use cookies and web beacons in the manner
described above.
to the relatively comprehensive (MayoClinic.com):
.. third party network advertisers, along with other advertisers and
sponsors on the website, may use cookies, Web beacons (also called
single pixel GIFs or action tags) or similar technologies (and, in the case
of cookies, access them on your computer if you choose to have cookies
enabled in your browser) to serve you advertisements tailored to interests
you have shown by browsing on this and other sites you have visited, to
determine whether you have seen a particular advertisement before, to
avoid sending you duplicated advertisements and to serve you
advertisements on other sites. In doing so, the provider collects nonpersonal data such as your browser type, your operating system, Web
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pages visited, time of visits, content viewed, ads viewed and other
clickstream data.
All four of these policies correctly identify that the collection and use of NPII by third parties is
controlled by the privacy policy of the third party site. This statement, in the MayoClinic.com
privacy policy, is typical:
The use of third party cookies, Web beacons and similar technologies by
these ad network providers is governed by each third party's specific
privacy policy, not this one.
None of the sites, however, explicitly indicates to the user that this third party NPII
collection occurs during simple browsing on the website, and does not require clickthrough on an
ad or hyperlink to another website. Given that the text of the policies explicitly indicates that the
third parties control the NPII that is collected, users might be forgiven for assuming that the data
collection itself is activated if and only if the user interacts directly with that third party. It is also
worth noting the use of conditional language to describe deployment of third party cookies and
web beacons. Every policy that mentioned these techniques used the term ‘may’ to describe their
use, even though the site itself allows the web beacons and third party cookies to operate, and
indeed must have included the relevant code in their own web page. Thus, the conditional
language serves only to obfuscate the actual practice on the sites.
Five of the six policies (the policy for MedHelp.com was the sole exception) offer
information about opting out of first party cookies. In every case, there is an accompanying
warning that opting out could reduce the website functionality and compromise browsing
experience. Thus, for example, MayoClinic.com indicates “If you reject cookies from our site,
some parts of the site may not work properly for you’. Three of these policies provide some
(limited) information to users about how to reject cookies, directing users to the ‘help’ section in
their browser toolbar. It is worth noting that none of the website privacy policies acknowledge
that opt-outs limit only collection of NPII through traditional cookies, and thus do not affect web
beacons or other newer mechanisms (e.g., flash cookies). Without this information, the policies
could lead users to incorrectly assume that by refusing cookies they are stopping all NPII
collection.
Four of the sites provide information on how to opt out of third party cookies, directing
users to the privacy policy of the third party in question (e.g., Google, or DoubleClick) or to the
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Network Advertising Initiative. Thus, the privacy policies typically send users to outside sites for
additional information about data collection practices and information about user choices; only
after receiving this information from an outside source can the user choose to opt out of third
party tracking.

2.3 Results for French Language Websites
Each of the selected French language websites also sets first-party cookies, both sessional
and persistent. The minimum number of first-party cookies observed was 8 (PasseportSante.net)
and the maximum number was 21 (FmCoeur.qc.ca). Each website had at least one persistent first
party cookie that lasted for 2 years or longer, and one site (Vulgaris-Medical.com) set a persistent
first party cookie that lasted for 10 years. In addition, the six selected health information sites set
between 46 (FmCoeur.qc.ca) and 262 (Vulgaris-Medical.com) third party cookies, and included
between 22 (Cancer.ca) and 96 (Vulgaris-Medical.com) beacons. At least one advertiser
(DoubleClick, AddThis, etc.) was included among the third parties present on each of the sites.
Thus, we know that at every one of the selected sites users are subject to first party behavioural
tracking as well as third party tracking by advertising agencies using both cookies and web
beacons to monitor user behaviour.
2.3.1. Notice of NPII Collection
We first examined each of the privacy policies for explicit discussion of the collection of
NPII. Only three of the six policies (FmCoeur.qc.ca, Vulgaris-Medical.com and TopSante.com)
had some direct mention of first party collection of NPII and none explicitly discussed third party
collection of this type of information. Somewhat surprisingly, no disclosure of third party NPII
collection is made in any of the policies.
FmCoeur.qc.ca had the clearest disclosure of first-party NPII collection, indicating that
the IP address, the internet provider, the time of the visit, the webpage from which the user
accessed the website, the operating system and all the content seen on the website might be
automatically recorded:
Il est possible que les sites Web recueillent automatiquement certains
renseignements non identificatoires au sujet de leurs utilisateurs,
notamment l’adresse IP de leur ordinateur, l’adresse IP de leur fournisseur
d’accès Internet, la date et l’heure à laquelle ils ont accédé aux sites Web,
l’adresse URL du site à partir duquel ils se sont rendus directement aux
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sites Web, le système d’exploitation qu’ils utilisent, les sections du site
Web qu’ils consultent, les pages des sites Web qu’ils ont lues et les
images qu’ils ont vues, ainsi que les documents qu’ils affichent sur les
sites Web ou qu’ils téléchargent à partir de ceux-ci. Les renseignements
non identificatoires sont utilisés pour l’exploitation de nos services Web,
le maintien de la qualité des services et la compilation de statistiques
générales au sujet de l’utilisation de nos services Web.
Note the use of the third person (“les sites Web”) and a conditional structure (“Il est possible
que”); these linguistic strategies serve to reduce the perceived agency of the website with respect
to first party NPII collection.
Vulgaris-Medical.com and TopSante.com are much more succinct in their disclosure of
the collection of NPII. Vulgaris-Medical.com indicates only that the webpage from which the
user accessed the website, the internet provider and the IP address are recorded (we cannot
determine exactly what NPII the site collects):
A l'occasion de l'utilisation du site www.vulgaris-medical.com, sont
notamment recueillies les informations suivantes qui ne sont pas
considérées comme personnelles (les « Informations Non Personnelles »):
•
l'adresse Internet URL des liens par l'intermédiaire desquels
l'Utilisateur a accédé au site www.vulgaris-medical.com
•
le fournisseur d'accès de l'Utilisateur.
A l'occasion de l'utilisation du site www.vulgaris-medical.com, est
recueillie l'adresse de protocole Internet (IP) de l'Utilisateur l'information
qui est considérée comme une Information Personnelle par une partie de
la jurisprudence et par la CNIL.
Top-Sante.com indicates that “one cookie” is placed on the user computer, recording information
that will be used in the future such as the pages visited and time of the visit, but they do not
provide an explicit list of recorded information:
topsante.com vous informe qu'un cookie est placé dans votre ordinateur
lorsque vous naviguez sur son site. Un cookie ne nous permet pas de vous
identifier. De manière générale, il enregistre des informations relatives à
la navigation de votre ordinateur sur notre site (les pages que vous avez
consultées, la date et l'heure de la consultation, etc.) que nous pourrons
lire lors de vos visites ultérieures.
Although these sites do not use linguistic strategies to reduce the perceived agency of the website
with respect to NPII collection, both sites provide only a partial list of the NPII that is collected
(the lists are qualified by ‘notamment’ and etc.).
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The three other websites provide less detailed disclosure about this type of first party data
collection. PasseportSante.net, for instance, indicates that they may record “audience measures”,
such as number of pages visited and user activities, through cookies:
Afin de vous assurer le meilleur service possible, nous pourrions être
amenés à procéder à des mesures d'audience de notre site (nombre de
pages vues, activité des visiteurs etc.) via la technologie des cookies.
The other websites, Cancer.ca and InfoBebes.com, only mention that they automatically collect
“data” to improver their website without mentioning what information is collected.
No disclosure of third party NPII collection is made in any of the policies. Only two
websites, PasseportSante.net and TopSante.com, mention that NPII could be linked to
advertisement. PasseportSante.net indicates that cookies are used for ends linked to
advertisement:
Les cookies sont alors utilisés notamment pour des finalités liées à la
publicité […]
Top-Sante.com indicates that NPII can be used to limit the number of times a user sees an
advertisement (clearly a form of targeting):
[…] de limiter éventuellement le nombre de délivrance d'une même
bannière publicitaire à un même utilisateur.
PasseportSante.net also mentions that it is possible to block third-party cookies, without
mentioning them elsewhere in the policy, and thus not disclosing that these cookies are being set,
how they are being used, etc.
2.3.2 Notice of Behavioural Tracking Mechanisms
Five of the privacy policies provide a definition of the term ‘cookie’; none, however,
mentions web beacons. Moreover, none of them provides a comprehensive discussion about
cookies. Cancer.ca provides the most thorough definition:
Un témoin est un petit fichier de données que le serveur d’une page Web
transfère dans votre navigateur et qui ne peut être lu que par le serveur qui
vous l’a transmis. Il s’agit en fait d’une « carte d’identité »; ce fichier
n’est pas un programme et ne peut servir à exécuter un code informatique
ou être porteur d’un virus. La Société n'analyse pas et ne rapporte pas sur
les sessions personnelles d’un utilisateur, et ne redirige jamais les témoins
vers d'autres serveurs.
While accurate, this definition does not mention the different types of cookies (session or
permanent, first- and third-party, etc.). Passeport-Sante-net, Vulgaris-Medical.com and
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FmCoeur.qc.ca offer only a very brief definition, identifying cookies as ‘small data files’ or
‘small pieces of information’ that are stored or placed on the user’s computer. In each of these
three cases, a minimizing adjective is used to describe the information collected, suggesting that
this information (and therefore any privacy risk it entails) is negligible. Interestingly, Topsante.com indicates — inaccurately according to our results — that “one cookie” is set when
navigating its website, while at the same time failing to define the term:
topsante.com vous informe qu'un cookie est placé dans votre ordinateur
lorsque vous naviguez sur son site.
Another inaccuracy can be found the policy of Passeport-Sante.net, where it is mentioned that
cookies will only last for one year (data indicate at least one first-party cookie on this website
was set to last for two years). Finally, InfoBebes.com does not mention cookies in its privacy
policy.
Three of the six policies (Vulgaris-Merical.com, Top-Sante.com and Passeport-sante.net)
offer information about rejecting cookies. Passeport-sante.net provides the most complete
information, indicating that users can refuse all cookies or third-party cookies:
Nous informons les internautes que les versions récentes des principaux
navigateurs permettent non seulement de s'opposer à l'enregistrement de
cookies mais également d'effectuer des sessions de navigation à l'issue
desquelles tous les cookies installés lors de cette session sont
automatiquement effacés indépendamment de leur durée de vie prévue,
offrant ainsi une meilleur protection des traces.
Ces derniers disposent encore d'outils permettant de gérer les cookies et
notamment:
•

de bloquer les cookies issus de sites "tiers", c'est à dire ceux qui
sont affichés par un autre site que celui qui affiche le contenu
principal,

•

de créer des "listes noires" de sites pour lesquels il faut bloquer les
cookies.

The two other websites only mention that it is possible to use the browser setting to manage
cookies. It is worth noting that none of the website privacy policies acknowledge that opt-outs
limit only collection of NPII through traditional cookies, and thus do not affect web beacons or
other newer mechanisms (e.g., flash cookies). Without this information, the policies could lead
users to incorrectly assume that by refusing cookies they are stopping all NPII collection.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed the disclosure, in two sets of website privacy policies, of the
collection of non-personally identifiable information (NPII). The websites selected all engage in
first and third party behavioural tracking using cookies and web beacons. For the English
language websites, these sites represent a purposive sample of the recommended sites and they
include government and commercial sources, encompassing sites with relatively low levels of
tracking as well as those with much higher levels. For the French language sites, these sites
represent the French language versions of two sites that appeared in the English recommended
lists as well as the Google results plus four other websites purposively selected where third party
trackers were observed. These include not-for-profit and commercial sources and encompass sites
with relatively low levels of tracking as well as sites with much higher levels of tracking.
Our focus in this chapter was an analysis of the disclosure of these practices. Such
disclosure is not generally required under regulatory frameworks stemming from Fair
Information Practice Principles (such as PIPEDA) except insofar as this information is deemed
to be personally identifiable. Nonetheless, disclosure of NPII collection falls within the spirit of
the underlying guidelines (e.g., Fair Information Practice Principles), which are designed to
protect user privacy in online spaces. Moreover, disclosure is required under self-regulatory
principles (e.g., United States Federal Trade Commission, 2009), newer privacy regulations (e.g.,
the 2009 EU directive 2009/136/EC), and newer interpretations of existing guidelines (e.g., the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Policy Position on Online Behavioural
Advertising). It is relevant to ask, therefore, whether privacy policies effectively disclose
behavioural tracking practices.
The majority of the French and English language privacy policies we analysed (10 of 13)
include at least some disclosure of first party behavioural tracking, but less than half of them (5
of 13) acknowledge behavioural tracking on their websites by third parties. The effectiveness of
this disclosure furthermore is limited by the use of complex language, and passive and sometimes
conditional grammatical constructions (see Pollach, 2005). The majority of the policies (11 of 13)
also provide some information about behavioural tracking mechanisms, including the fact that
users can opt-out of cookies (8 of 13). While opt-out information is important and in fact required
in emerging regulatory frameworks (e.g., EU Directive 2009/136/EC), the direct pairing of opt-
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out information with discussion of the negative consequences for user experience is likely to
deter people from using this option to limit behavioural tracking.
Within the privacy policies we examined, disclosure of documented third-party tracking
practices was limited, and the language used in the disclosures that did appear tended to be
difficult to interpret. Thus, reading a privacy policy might not provide users with a full
understanding of the behavioural tracking practices of the websites they visit, and as a result we
need to consider additional mechanisms to identify and respond to behavioural tracking.
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Chapter 3: Detecting, Mitigating, and Neutralizing Behavioural
Tracking
The results of this research indicate that behavioural tracking on consumer health
information websites is widespread, with the large majority of such sites including some form of
third-party tracking, and approximately half of the sites participating in tracking by third-party
advertisers, a practice that raises the most significant privacy concerns. Our analysis of website
privacy policies with respect to disclosure of these tracking practices reveals that even those
policies that acknowledge tracking do so in ways that make it difficult to determine the tracking
practices that are in place. From the perspective of consumers, these issues are exacerbated by the
fact that sites recommended by librarians and other information science professionals are also
likely to engage in behavioural tracking. Government sites, and to a lesser extent not-for-profit
sites, show a lower level of behavioural tracking compared to commercial sites. This difference,
however, is restricted to third-party advertising trackers, and does not apply to trackers in general.
Increasingly, regulatory frameworks are being developed, or extended, to cover the
collection and use of NPII, and internet users who are concerned about the collection and use of
their personal information through behavioural tracking measures can launch complaints to
relevant bodies, including the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Information
Commissioner’s Office in the United Kingdom. However, in the absence of direct investigation,
triggered by such a complaint or launched by the organization responsible for regulatory
enforcement, consumers cannot be assured that websites comply with applicable regulations. The
situation is complicated by the fact that regulatory interpretation can be challenging. In Canada,
for example, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada recently reported findings on the use of
sensitive health information for targeting of Google ads9, determining that this use contravened
both PIPEDA and the organization’s privacy policy. The complaint was determined to be wellfounded, and in response Google undertook remedial measures that included period searches for
the use of terms such as ‘CPAP’ or ‘sleep apnea’ within Google advertising products. This
response, while effective for the particular complaint in question, does not provide general
9

[1] https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2014/2014_001_0114_e.asp
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protection with respect to Google use of other information that users might consider sensitive: the
use of behavioural tracking information on searches for ‘epilepsy’ or ‘weight loss’, for example,
is not being monitored by Google. Regulation of the collection and use of NPII is important, and
the actions of regulatory bodies in this respect are valuable and effective. At the same time,
however, users cannot rely on these regulatory responses for privacy protection, and instead must
become active participants in the preservation of their privacy online.
In considering responses to limit or even eliminate behavioural tracking, it must first be
acknowledged that these practices provide some benefit to website users and thus it may not be
their desire or even in their best interests to eliminate behavioural tracking. Behavioural tracking
mechanisms enhance the experience of users in many ways and make the browsing experience
more efficient. They are used to personalize websites, display information relevant to the
geographic area where a user is located, remember registration details and content users have put
in a shopping basket. Targeted advertising can also be positive for many people. Ultimately, it
should be a user’s choice to decide when he or she wants to be tracked. Different levels of actions
are possible for users to control, on their own, when they are being tracked. Each of them,
however, comes with a downside.
The easiest step is for users to learn how to manage HTTP cookies in every web browser
that they use. Users can decide to refuse third-party cookies or even all cookies. The latter,
however, will make the make the browsing experience much less efficient and may impede users
from accessing some websites. Users should also learn how to delete cookies and think about
emptying the cookie file of each of their browsers periodically. A more advanced and more
complex step, yet crucial considering the capabilities of Flash cookies, is to learn how to manage
Flash Cookies through the Adobe Website Storage Settings Panel. Browser extensions, such as
Ghostery and AdBlock Plus10, can be added to most browsers. Ghostery allows users to block
trackers, either on a tracker-by-tracker basis, a site-by-site basis or a mixture of the two. Also
customable, Adblock Plus allows users to block either all advertisements or only the ones they do
not want to see. These extensions, however, may slow down Internet browsing.

10

https://adblockplus.org/
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Users can also change their Internet use habits. It is possible for user to use search engines
that do dot store any NPII, such as Ixquick11 and DuckDuckGo12. Ixquick returns the top ten
results from multiple search engines. It only sets one cookie that remembers a user’s search
preferences and that is deleted after a user does not visit Ixquick for 90 days. DuckDuckGo,
which returns the same search results for a given search term to all users, aims at getting
information from the best sources rather than the most sources. While these search engines do not
have all the functionality of the major search engines, both of them have received praise (e.g.
McCracken, 2011). The ultimate solution, one that allows a user to navigate online total
anonymity, is to use the Tor13 web browser, which impedes network surveillance or traffic
analysis and which the U.S. National Security Agency has characterized as “the King of high
secure, low latency Internet anonymity” (Schneier, 2013). The anonymity afforded by Tor,
however, comes at the price of reduced speed and limitations to available content.

11

https://www.ixquick.com/
https://duckduckgo.com/
13
www.torproject.org/torbrowser/
12

37

Chapter 4: Dissemination and Knowledge Mobilization
4.1 Dissemination to the Academic Community
Dissemination and knowledge mobilization activities for this project were carried out in
three domains: academic, professional, and general public. With respect to the first group, the
results of this research were presented to academic audiences at a number of academic
conferences (I3: Information, Interactions and Impact, June 25-28, 2013, Aberdeen, Scotland;
Association for Information Science and Technology: Beyond the Cloud: Rethinking Information
Boundaries, November 1-5, 2014, Montréal, Québec), and future presentations are planned at
several other conferences (Association French language pour le savoir, May 12-16, 2014,
Montréal, Québec; Graphics, Animation, and New Media, Annual Conference, May 14-16, 2014,
Ottawa, Ontario). The results of this research are in preparation for publication in academic
journals. The first of these papers will examine the presence of tracking on consumer health
websites, contrasting the results for sites recommended by library and information professionals
with the results for sites returned by Google searches. The second of these papers will examine
privacy policy disclosures of tracking mechanisms on consumer health websites. In future
publications, we will examine tracking mechanisms and privacy policy disclosures on French
language websites.

4.2 Dissemination to the Professional Community
An important aspect of dissemination involved communication of the research to
professionals in the library and information science community. Our goals in this professional
outreach are twofold: first, to improve the understanding of LIS professional regarding
behavioural tracking and associated privacy issues in order that they can make privacy-respecting
decisions and recommendations for themselves and their patrons; second, to provide background
to LIS professionals to support their digital literacy outreach initiatives. We have presented at the
Ontario Library Association Superconference (January 29 – February 1, Toronto, Ontario, and a
presentation on this research has been accepted at the Canadian Health Libraries Association
conference (June 16-20, 2014, Montréal, Québec). We are planning a webinar on behavioural
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tracking mechanisms and strategies to manage tracking for the Ontario Library Association; this
presentation will take place in the summer of 2014. Further opportunities to provide direct
education to information science professionals are available to each of the investigators in their
teaching activities. Dr. Burkell is a faculty member at the University of Western Ontario in the
Faculty of Information and Media Studies, where she regularly teaches a course on Consumer
Health Information, and she will integrate training on privacy and behavioural tracking in this
and other relevant courses. Mr. Fortier is completing his PhD in Library and Information Science.
He regularly teaches in the LIS program at UWO, and he will be seeking a faculty appointment
once he has completed his PhD. He too will have the opportunity to incorporate education
regarding privacy and behavioural tracking into his course syllabi. We are promoting the results
of the research and the educational initiatives including the video (see below) produced as part of
the project through a ‘Focus on Research’ profile on the Canadian Library Association website.
Finally, we are preparing a paper on behavioural tracking mechanisms and strategies to manage
these mechanisms for Library Quarterly, which is a journal directed to information professionals.

4.3 Dissemination to the Public
Finally, we have had opportunity for direct outreach to the general public. In partnership
with the London Public Library, we provided public lectures on behavioural tracking (January 27,
2014) and social network privacy (February 24, 2014). In addition, we have provided links to our
educational video and related publications for incorporation into library materials on online
privacy.
4.3.1 Educational Video
Another important aspect of dissemination involved the production and promotion of an
educational video on behavioural tracking mechanisms and responses. Copies of this educational
video were provided (on USB keys) to attendees at the Ontario Library Association conference,
and links to this educational material will be provided to the Canadian Library Association and
the Ontario Library Association for inclusion in their educational materials regarding privacy and
online behavioural tracking. This video was promoted at the public lecture offered at the London
Public Library, and links to the online versions (French and English) of the video were provided
to the London Public Library for use on their website and in their privacy-related educational
materials.
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The educational video was designed and produced for dissemination in presentations and
online through websites (such as public library websites). The video uses animation and
testimonials to create awareness of online tracking mechanisms with the following objectives:
•

To describe different kinds of mechanisms exist and how they work.

•

To present advantages and disadvantages these mechanisms may have for individuals in the
online environment.

•

To offer potential tools and protocols (through browsers or software) for managing these
mechanisms.

•

To present the implications of behavioural tracking from a privacy standpoint both on
general and consumer health websites.
Expert interviews were conducted with Valerie Steeves (University of Ottawa,

Department of Criminology), Avner Levin (Ryerson University, Ted Rogers School of
Management, Director of the Privacy Institute), Andrew Clement (University of Toronto, Faculty
of Information, Identity Privacy and Security Institute), and Jacquelyn Burkell (Western
University, Faculty of Information and Media Studies). These experts described the implications
of behavioural tracking and the broader picture of the state of privacy on the internet, including a
need for public awareness and ultimately public debate. In addition, we interviewed a number of
internet users regarding their understanding of and attitudes toward behavioural tracking. These
interviews were coupled with animated sequences explaining behavioural tracking mechanisms
and strategies for reducing behavioural tracking. Appendix V includes a copy of the final video
scripts in both English and French.
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Conclusion
Our investigation focused on consumer health information websites because, as we argue
in the introduction to this report, online searches for health information reveal highly sensitive
information. The privacy risks associated with tracking of health information seeking are,
therefore, exacerbated, and particular care must be taken to ensure that privacy is protected in the
health domain.
The results of this research demonstrate that third-party behavioural tracking is present on
the large majority (4 out of 5) of consumer health websites, and over half of consumer health
websites have trackers from third-party advertisers. This level of tracking is observed on French
and English language websites, and on those recommended by Library and Information Science
associations as well as those returned by a regular Google search. Government sites are
essentially free from tracking by third-party advertisers, and overall commercial sites show much
higher level of tracking (by advertisers and by third parties in general including analytics
companies) than do government sites or sites from not-for-profit agencies. Even government
sites, however, have high levels of tracking by non-advertising third parties including analytics
companies, and although the privacy implications of this type of third-party tracking are reduced
relative to advertising uses, privacy considerations remain (Mayer and Mitchell, 2012). Our
analysis of privacy policy disclosure of tracking practices indicates that disclosure is inconsistent,
incomplete, and difficult to understand. Thus, behavioural tracking is widespread on consumer
health information sites, and privacy policies are not effectively informing consumers of website
tracking practices.
This research provides a snapshot of behavioural tracking practices and disclosures on
consumer health information websites at a particular point in time (Spring 2013 for the English
language sites and Fall 2013 for the French language sites). We recognize that behavioural
tracking is a moving and indeed expanding target, and we have every reason to believe that
tracking practices on these sites will have changed since we completed our data collection: new
tracking companies will have emerged, new uses for behavioural tracking data will have been
identified, and new technologies will have been developed. The importance of our results is less
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the specific number and identity of trackers, and more the demonstration that behavioural
tracking is widespread on consumer health websites, that many of these websites allow third
party advertisers to collect behavioural data on their sites, and that the disclosure of these data
collection practices is insufficient to fully inform users.
Online privacy management is a digital literacy issue (Park, 2013), and users of consumer
health information websites need to be supported in identifying privacy-respecting resources and
making informed choices regarding their privacy. We consider Library and Information Science
professionals to play a critical role both in directing consumers to privacy-respecting resources
and in providing digital literacy education that will assist users of consumer health information
websites (and other websites as well) to make informed choices regarding their online privacy. In
order to address theses issues, Library and Information Science professionals must first become
familiar with these tracking mechanisms, the risks they present, and the strategies (such as setting
browsers to refuse cookies) that consumers can use to combat them. Second, they must monitor
the behaviour tracking practices of the websites they recommend to consumers, identifying those
websites that use behavioural tracking mechanisms and therefore present to users the privacy
risks associated with profiling. Finally, Library and Information Science professionals should
engage in digital literacy initiatives that promote an understanding, among the general public, of
online behavioural tracking, including the related privacy risks and responses to mitigate these
risks (Lankshear and Noble, 2008). The research results reported here and the activities
undertaken to disseminate these results will assist in achieving these goals.
While regulatory frameworks serve to limit behavioural tracking and mandate disclosure
of tracking practices, it is also important that users take measures to understand the privacy risks
they encounter, and make informed decisions about their own online privacy. Ultimately, the
Internet is a place where users must protect themselves, and we must provide them with the tools
and information they need to do so.
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Appendix I: Recommended Websites
http://www.intelihealth.com/

http://www.virtualpediatrichospital.org

http://my.clevelandclinic.org/

http://aarp.org/health/

http://familydoctor.org/

http://www.aoa.gov/

http://hardinmd.lib.uiowa.edu/

http://www.agingcare.com/

http://www.healthfinder.gov/

http://www.healthinaging.org/

http://www.healthlinkplus.org/

http://www.medicare.gov/

http://www.mayoclinic.com/

http://www.caregiver.org

http://www.medhelp.org/
http://www.medicinenet.com/

http://www.firstgov.gov/Topics/Seniors.sht
ml/

http://www.medlineplus.gov

http://www.gmhfonline.org/gmhf/

http://www.netwellness.org/

http://nihseniorhealth.gov/

http://www.noah-health.org

http://www.alz.org/

http://www.feminist.com/

http://www.aad.org/public

http://www.hormone.org/

http://www.ada.org/

http://www.ihr.com/

http://www.diabetes.org/

http://www.mypelvichealth.org/

http://www.americanheart.org/

http://www.healthywomen.org

http://www.lungusa.org/

http://www.menopause.org

http://www.aafa.org/

http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org

http://www.cancer.gov/

http://www.womenshealth.gov/

http://digestive.niddk.nih.gov/index.htm/

http://www.ahrq.gov/

http://www.nei.nih.gov/health/

http://www.cdc.gov/

http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/

http://www.urologyhealth.org/

http://www.nichd.nih.gov/

http://www.aap.org

http://www.nia.nih.gov/

http://www.aacap.org/

http://www.niams.nih.gov/

http://www.drgreene.com

http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/index
.shtml/

http://www.whattoexpect.com

http://www.ninds.nih.gov

http://www.kidshealth.org

http://www.stroke.org/

http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health

http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/

I

http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/DrugsNew/Def
ault.aspx?MenuItem=Drugs&Search=On

http://ClinicalTrials.gov/

http://www.centerwatch.com/patient/drugs/d
rugdirectories.html

http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/

http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugI
nfo.cfm?id=2115

http://www.quackwatch.com/

http://www.emedicinehealth.com/
http://hpd.nlm.nih.gov/

http://www.fda.gov

http://www.aboutkidshealth.ca/

http://www.longwoodherbal.org

http://www.caringforkids.cps.ca/

http://www.mskcc.org/cancercare/integrative-medicine/about-herbsbotanicals-other-products

http://www.cancer.ca/
http://canadasafetycouncil.org/
http://www.dietitians.ca/

http://druginfo.nlm.nih.gov/drugportal/drugp
ortal.jsp

http://www.heartandstroke.com/

http://www.needymeds.org

http://www.heretohelp.bc.ca/

http://www.pdrhealth.com/home/home.aspx

http://sexualityandu.ca/

http://www.rxlist.com/script/main/hp.asp

http://passeportsante.net/

http://www.ama-assn.org/aps/amahg.htm

http://www.womenshealthmatters.ca/

http://www.centerwatch.com/
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Appendix II: Websites Returned by Google (English)
http://allergicliving.com/
http://allergies.about.com/
http://allergyuk.org/
http://bodyandhealth.canada.com/
http://canadiansleepsociety.com/
http://chealth.canoe.ca/
http://curegoutpainnow.com/
http://diabetes.about.com/
http://diabetesshop.ca/
http://en.wikipedia.org/
http://findprivateclinics.ca/
http://forums.parentscanada.com/
http://health.nytimes.com/
http://heartdisease.about.com/
http://helpguide.org/
http://inspection.gc.ca/
http://lung.ca/
http://lupuscanada.org/
http://lupusuk.org.uk/
http://pollen.com/
http://ruk.ca/
http://skin-disorders.net/
http://sleepclinic.org/
http://sleepdisorders.about.com/
http://sleepmed.to/
http://sleepnet.com/
http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/
http://thelupussite.com/
http://www.aftershingles.com/
http://www.agingincanada.ca/
http://www.allergyfoundation.ca/
http://www.arthritis.about.com
http://www.arthritis.ca/
http://www.bbc.co.uk/

http://www.bhf.org.uk/
http://www.canada.com/
http://www.canadiansleepsociety.com/
http://www.cbc.ca/
http://www.ctv.ca
http://www.dailyglow.com/
http://www.diabetes.com/
http://www.doctorq.ca/
http://www.everydayhealth.com/
http://www.fascrs.org/
http://www.gallbladderattack.com
http://www.gallbladderdetox.com/
http://www.gallbladdersymptomsz.com/
http://www.gout-aware.com/
http://www.gout.com/
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/
http://www.healthcommunities.com/
http://www.heart.org/
http://www.heartandstroke.com/
http://www.hemorrhoids.org/
http://www.hemorrhoidtreatment.info/
http://www.imhr.ca/
http://www.lupus.org/
http://www.lupusontario.org/
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/
http://www.medicinenet.com
http://www.natcm.ca/
http://www.naturalskinrepair.com/
http://www.netdoctor.co.uk/
http://www.nhs.uk/
http://www.patient.co.uk/
http://www.pilex.com/
http://www.publichealthgreybruce.on.ca/
http://www.rheumatology.org/

III

http://www.rolingstone.com/
http://www.sages.org/
http://www.skincarecentre.ca/
http://www.skinsight.com/
http://www.sleepdisorders.com/
http://www.sleepdisorderssleepapnea.com/
http://www.sleepfoundation.org/

http://www.umm.edu/
http://www.washingtonpost.com/
http://www.webmd.com/
http://www.womenshealth.gov/
http://www.youtube.com/
http://yorkregionsleep.com/
http:/www.hemorrhoid.com/

IV

Appendix III: Websites Returned by Google (French)
http://afriquinfos.com/
http://agora.qc.ca/

http://santemedecine.commentcamarche.net/

http://arthritisbroadcastnetwork.org/

http://sante.canoe.ca/

http://asthme-allergies.org/

http://sante.journaldesfemmes.com/

http://asthmeallergies.com/

http://sante.lefigaro.fr/

http://ca.loccitane.com/

http://santecapitalenationale.gouv.qc.ca/

http://combattrelagoutte.ca/

http://santecheznous.ca/

http://cusm.ca/

http://santenature.over-blog.com/

http://dejouerlesallergies.com/

http://selection.readersdigest.ca/

http://diabete.fr/

http://styledevie.ca.msn.com/

http://drdupied.com/

http://survivornet.ca/

http://fr.healthierchoices.ca/

http://tf1.fr/

http://fr.wiktionary.org/

http://tvanouvelles.ca/

http://grmo.ca/

http://www.aaia.ca/

http://immunize.ca/

http://www.accu-chek.fr/

http://infotheque.muhc.ca/

http://www.afd.asso.fr/

http://jointhealth.org/

http://www.alfediam.org/

http://lecoeurtelquelles.ca/

http://www.allodocteurs.fr/

http://lesexploitsducoeur.ca/

http://www.alzheimerestrie.com/

http://lyon-sud.univ-lyon1.fr/

http://www.antiphlogistine.com/

http://muhcpatienteducation.ca/

http://www.anusol.ca/

http://naitreetgrandir.com/

http://www.aqaa.qc.ca/

http://pilule.telequebec.tv/

http://www.arthrite.ca/

http://pourquoi-docteur.nouvelobs.com/

http://www.atoute.org/

http://qualita.ca/

http://www.avogel.ca/

http://quebec.huffingtonpost.ca/

http://www.babycenter.ca/

http://rire.ctreq.qc.ca/

http://www.bayerdiabetes.ca/

http://sante-az.aufeminin.com/

http://www.bd.com/

http://sante-guerir.notrefamille.com/

http://www.brainpop.fr/
http://www.canalvie.com/

V

http://www.cancer.ca/

http://www.dumaisnd.qc.ca/

http://www.carenity.com/

http://www.e-diabete.org/

http://www.carevox.fr/

http://www.e-sante.fr/

http://www.ceed-diabete.org/

http://www.eatrightontario.ca/

http://www.cfpc.ca/

http://www.educationnutrition.org/

http://www.chirurgie-digestive-bizet.com/

http://www.elle.fr/

http://www.chu-sainte-justine.org/

http://www.ellequebec.com/

http://www.chumontreal.qc.ca/

http://www.enfant-encyclopedie.com/

http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/

http://www.entraidediabetique.org/

http://www.clarisonic.ca/

http://www.entrepatients.net/

http://www.cliniquealthea.com/

http://www.esantementale.ca/

http://www.cliniquedrdanielbarolet.com/

http://www.estelledaves.com

http://www.cliniquevaccinationrivesud.com/

http://www.eurekasante.fr/

http://www.collabopm.com/

http://www.extenso.org/

http://www.comprendrechoisir.com/

http://www.familiprix.com/

http://www.coupdepouce.com/

http://www.femmeactuelle.fr/

http://www.cpa.ca/

http://www.femmesensante.ca/

http://www.crc.chus.qc.ca/

http://www.fissureanale.com/

http://www.crisedegoutte.com/

http://www.fmcoeur.qc.ca/

http://www.crisegoutte.com/

http://www.fmoq.org/

http://www.crulrg.ulaval.ca/

http://www.futura-sciences.com/

http://www.cssslaval.qc.ca/

http://www.germannewmedicine.ca/

http://www.curel.ca/

http://www.gralon.net/

http://www.dermatonet.com/

http://www.groupeproxim.ca/

http://www.dermatoveto.com/

http://www.gsk.ca/

http://www.diabete.qc.ca/

http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/

http://www.diabetelaval.qc.ca/

http://www.healthycanadians.gc.ca/

http://www.diabetes.ca/

http://www.hemoroidetraitement.com/

http://www.docteurclic.com/

http://www.herbes-medicinales.ca/

http://www.doctissimo.fr/

http://www.inflammgen.org/

http://www.dolfino.tv/

http://www.info-sante.info/

http://www.douglas.qc.ca/

http://www.infobebes.com/

http://www.douleurchronique.org/

http://www.inserm.fr/
VI

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/

http://www.orpha.net/

http://www.inspq.qc.ca/

http://www.osrmedical.com/

http://www.jeancoutu.com/

http://www.ottawaheart.ca/

http://www.jetaide.com/

http://www.parlonsdiabete.com/

http://www.kidney.ca/

http://www.passeportsante.net

http://www.lapresse.ca/

http://www.peau.net/

http://www.laroche-posay.fr/

http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/

http://www.lemonde.fr/

http://www.plaisirssante.ca/

http://www.linternaute.com/

http://www.pourlascience.fr/

http://www.liver.ca/

http://www.pq.poumon.ca/

http://www.lupus-reference.info/

http://www.procto.ca/

http://www.lupuscanada.org/

http://www.protegez-vous.ca/

http://www.lupusreunion.com/

http://www.psychologies.com/

http://www.madmoizelle.com/

http://www.rhumatismes.net/

http://www.marlene-morin.ca/

http://www.santedesfemmes.com/

http://www.maxisciences.com/

http://www.santeprivee.ca/

http://www.medecine-et-sante.com/

http://www.santevoyagehorizon.com/

http://www.medscape.fr/

http://www.saveurs-sante.com/

http://www.medtronic.fr/

http://www.savoirlaitier.ca/

http://www.medtronicdiabete.ca/

http://www.sdhu.com/

http://www.merial.ca/

http://www.securite-allergie.ca/

http://www.moietcie.ca/

http://www.sfdiabete.org/

http://www.momes.net/

http://www.shepellfgi.com/

http://www.montreal-diabetes-researchcenter.org/

http://www.skinceuticals.fr/

http://www.msss.gouv.qc.ca/

http://www.snfge.asso.fr/

http://www.msss.gouv.qc.ca/

http://www.sommeil-mg.net/

http://www.nospetitsmangeurs.org/

http://www.sos-hemorroides.fr/

http://www.notretemps.com/

http://www.specialisteschirurgie.ca/

http://www.novartis.ca/

http://www.topsante.com/

http://www.oiiq.org/

http://www.uniprix.com/

http://www.oncologik.fr/

http://www.virtuogym.com/

http://www.ordrepsy.qc.ca/

http://www.vivre-mieux-naturellement.com/

http://www.skinpatientalliance.ca/

VII

http://www.vulgaris-medical.com/

http://yoopa.ca/

http://www.who.int/

https://fr.wikipedia.org/

http://www.zostavax.ca/

https://sommeil.univ-lyon1.fr/

http://www1.pharmaprix.ca/
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Appendix IV: Trackers
[X+1]

Adometry

bidswitch.net

24/7 Media*14

AdoTube

Bizo

5min Media

Adroit Digital Solutions

Blink New Media

Accuen Media

AdRoll

BlueCava

Acuity Ads

AdScale

BlueKai

Acuityads.com

AdTech*

Bluelithium

Acxiom

Advert Stream

BlueStreak

Ad Decisive

Advertising.com

Boldchat

ad6media

AdXpose

BrandScreen

AdAction

Adyoulike

Bright Tag

ADAOS

Aggregate Knowledge

BrightCove

Adap.TV

Akamai

BrightRoll

Adblade

Alenty

Brilig

adBrite

AlmondNet

Burst Media

Adconion

Amazon Associates*

Buysight

AddThis

AMP Platform

BuzzFeed

AdForm

AOL Advertising*

C-Col.com

AdGear

AOL OBA Notice

CanWest Global

Adify

AppNexus*

Casale Media

Adition

areyouahuman

Cedexis Radar

AdJug

AT Internet

Centro

Adknowledge

Atedre

Chango

Adloox

Atlas

Chartbeat

AdMeld*

atmda.com

ClearSaleinG

Adnologies

Audience Science

Clearsaleing

Adobe Adlens

Aweber

Clickbank

Adobe Digital Marketing

Banner Connect

Clickbooth

Bazaarvoice

ClickTale

BBElements

Clicky

14

The trackers followed by an
asterisk are those identified as
advertisers.

IX

ClixGalore

DoubleVerify

Gigya Socialize

Collective

Drawbridge

Google +1

Commission Junction

Dynamic Logic

Google Adsense*

CompeteXL

EchoSearch

Google AdWords*

Connexity

Effective Measure

Google AJAX Search API

ContextIn

Ensighten

Google Analytics

ConvertMedia

EQ Advertising

Convio

eStat

Google Custom Search
Engine

Conviva

EverydayHealth

CoreAudience

Evidon Notice

CPX Interactive

eXelate Media

Crazy Egg
Criteo

Experian Marketing
Services

Crowd Science

Exponential*

hearst.co.uk

Dataium

eXTReMe Tracker

Hello Bar

Datalogix

eyeReturn Marketing

HIRO

DataXu

Eyeview

Histats

delvenetworks.com

Ezakus

Hit-Parade

Demandware Analytics

Facebook

i-Behavior

DemDex

Facebook Beacon

Impact-ad

DG Mediamind*

Facebook Connect

Improve Digital

Didit Maestro

Facebook Conversion

Impulse

Didit Maestro

Facebook Exchange (FBX)

InfoLinks

Digilant

Facebook Social Graph

Infolinks

Disqus

Facebook Social Plugins

Integral Ad Science

Dotomi

Flashtalking.com

InviteMedia

Dotsub

FluidSurveys

iPerceptions

DoubleClick Bid
Manager*

FlyerTown

Jumptap

ForeSee

Kaltura

DoubleClick DART

FreeWheel

Kenshoo

DoubleClick Floodlight

FruitFlan

Kintera

Doubleclick Spotlight

GDN Notice

KissInsights

DoubleClick*

Gigya

Komli

X

Google JSAPI Stats
Collection
Google Tag Manager
Gravity.com
gsk.com

Korrelate

MyFonts Counter

PubMatic*

Krux Digital

Netmining

PulsePoint

LeadBack

NetRatings

Qualtrics

Legolas Media

NetSeer

Quantcast*

Ligatus

Neustar AdAdvisor

Qubit

Lijit

New Relic

Questionmarket

Lijit Networks

news registry

RadiumOne

LinkedIn

NextAction

RapLeaf

Linksmart

nRelate

Redux Media

LivePerson

Nugg.Ad

Resonate Networks

LiveRail

OMD (Omincom)

Right Media*

LiveRamp

Omniture

Rivity

Lockerz Share

Ooyala

rnengage

LongTail Video Analytics

Opentracker

Rocket Fuel

Lotame

OpenX*

ROI trax

Lucid Media

Optimax Media Delivery

Rubicon*

Magnetic

Optimizely

Sas

MaxPoint Interactive

orlive.com

saymedia

McAffee Secure

Outbrain

Medbroadcast

OwnerIQ

ScoreCard Research
Beacon

Media Innovation

OwnerIQ

scribblelive

Media Optimizer

Parse.ly

Segmint

Media6Degrees

Perfect Audience

ShareThis

MediaMath*

Pingdom

SimpleReach

MediaMind

Pinterest

Simpli.fi

Mediaplex

Piwik Analytics

SiteMeter

Metrigo

Piximedia

SiteScout

Microsoft Atlas*

Platform161

skimlinks*

Mindset Media

PointRoll

skyword

MixPanel

Polldaddy

SMART AdServer*

MLN Advertising

Prisma Media Digital

SocialReach

Moat

Proven Pixel

Soundcloud

Monetate

Public Ideas

SpecificClick

XI

SpecificMEDIA

Trove

Visual Revenue

Spongecell

Truste Notice

Visual Website Optimiser

SpotXchange

Tube Mogul

Vizu

Statcounter

TubeMogul

VoiceFive

SundaySky

Tumblr Buttons

WaterfrontMedia

surfing-waves.com

Turn*

WebMD

Surveymonkey.com

Twitter Advertising

Weborama

Switch Adserver

Twitter Badge

WebTrends

Taboola

Twitter Button

WidgetBox

Tacoda

Twitter.com

Wishabi

Tapad

Tynt

WordPress Stats

Targus Info

Tynt Insigh

Wunderloop Connect

Tedemis

Typekit by Adobe

WysiStat

Telemetry

Typekit by Adobe

Yahoo Analytics

theGuardian

Undertone Networks

Yahoo! Ad Network

TidalTV

Unica

Yieldlab

tinyurl

Userreport

Youtube.com

Topsy

UserVoice.com

YuMe

TradeDesk

ValueClick Mediaplex*

Zanox

tradedoubler

Veruta

Zazzle

Tradelab

Videoplaza

Zedo

Tremor Video

VigLink

Zenovia Digital Exchange

Tribal Fusion

Vimeo

Triggit

Vindico
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Appendix V: Scripts for the Dissemination Video

Speaker

English script

French script

S1 [LIVE]: VIDEO TEASER (VAL, AVNER, ANDREW) (about 17 seconds)
Val

Because that kind of surveillance is
invisible online, we kind of go to sleep.

Parce que ce genre de surveillance est
invisible en ligne, c’est comme si nous
étions endormis.

Avner

Unfortunately right now we don’t have
effective protection.

Malheureusement, nous n’avons pas en ce
moment de protection efficace.

Andrew

We now have installed a major spying
operation which has gone by completely
without public debate.

Nous avons désormais installé une
opération d’espionnage majeure sans que
le moindre débat public ait eu lieu.

Text

They know where you've been, they know On sait ce que vous regardez, on sait ce
what you've done
que vous aimez
Online behavioural tracking

Le pistage comportemental en ligne

S2 V/O [ANIMATION]
Narrator When you look up medical information
on the Internet, you probably know that
some of it might be inaccurate or
misleading. But there’s another problem
that’s less obvious. It’s called behavioural
tracking, and its effects can be just as
serious.

Vous savez peut-être que l’information
relative à la santé sur internet peut être
incomplète, biaisée, voire simplement
erronée. Or, savez-vous qu’il faut aussi
vous méfier d’un problème presque
invisible dont les effets peuvent être tout
aussi néfastes : le pistage
comportemental.

Text

Le pistage comportemental en ligne

Online behavioural tracking

S3 V/O [ANIMATION]
Narrator Mechanisms for behavioural tracking
include browser cookies as well as newer
technologies such as flash cookies and
web beacons.

Le pistage comportemental utilise
l’agrégation de données non personnelles
obtenues par des mécanismes tels les
témoins et les pixels-espions.

Text

Behavioural tracking mechanisms

Les mécanismes de pistage
comportemental

Browser cookies

Témoins de navigateur

Flash cookies

Témoins Flash

Web beacons

Pixels-espions

XIII

Narrator Browser cookies are small text files that
are stored on your computer when you
visit a website. They contain information
such as your IP address, the pages you
visit, the time of your visit, and your
actions on the site.

Text

Les témoins, aussi appelés « cookies »,
sont de petits fichiers sauvegardés sur
votre ordinateur lorsque vous visitez un
site web. Ils contiennent des
renseignements tels que votre adresse IP,
les pages web que vous visitez, le temps
de votre visite et vos actions sur le site
web.

There are two types of cookies: First
Party Cookies and Third Party Cookies.

Les témoins peuvent provenir du site web
que vous visitez ou d’une tierce partie.

Browser cookies

Témoins de navigateur

IP address

Adresse IP

Pages visited

Pages visitées

Time spent

Temps passé

Mouse clicks

Actions de l’utilisateur

First-party cookies

Témoins provenant du site web visité

Third-party cookies

Témoins provenant de tierces parties

Narrator First Party Cookies are written and read
by a website each time you visit. The
information stored is typically used to
personalize your experience on the site:
for example, to show you new
information related to a previous search.
A history of your visits to the website can
be assembled by using the information
stored on these types of cookies. First
Party Cookies written by one site cannot
be accessed by other websites and do not
generally present a privacy threat.

À chacune de vos visites sur un site web,
des témoins provenant du site web luimême peuvent enregistrer de
l’information sur vos actions et cette
information est normalement utilisée pour
personnaliser votre expérience. Le site
web peut se servir, par exemple, d’une
recherche antérieure pour vous montrer
des produits susceptibles de vous
intéresser. Les témoins provenant
directement du site web que vous visitez
ne sont pas accessibles à d’autres sites et
ne présentent d’ordinaire pas de menace à
la protection de votre vie privée.

Text

First-Party Cookies (set directly by the
website)

Témoins provenant du site web visité

“Remember this” (Or use "Save this")

Sauvegarder ceci

“You liked this”

Vous avez aimé ceci

“Try this”

Essayez cela

Narrator Sometimes, however, there are advertisers
present on a site. They can write what are
called Third-Party cookies. These same
advertisers will be present on many other
XIV

Il peut arriver, par contre, qu’un site web
contienne des témoins provenant de
tierces parties, tel un annonceur
publicitaire. Le même annonceur est

Text

sites that you visit and they have access to
information about all of these visits
through cookies that they write.

souvent présent sur plusieurs sites et
possède donc un accès privilégié à vos
comportements sur le web grâce à
l’agrégation de données colligées d’un
site web à l’autre.

Third-Party cookies present a bigger
privacy problem because as you surf the
web, advertisers build a detailed profile
on what you like, what you do, even what
worries you by linking together the
information from the many cookies that
they write to your computer. Even though
you aren’t directly identified by this, a lot
of information is being saved.

Les témoins provenant de tierces parties
présentent une menace plus importante
pour la protection de votre vie privée, car
les profils qu’ils peuvent permettre
d’assembler sont très précis.

Sale

Solde

Third-Party Cookies (set by ads on the
website)

Témoins provenant de tierces parties

Narrator Advertisers use more than just cookies
such as newer technologies such as Flash
and web beacons.

De nouvelles technologies, tels les
témoins Flash et les pixels-espions sont
aussi utilisés.

Flash cookies are similar to HTTP
cookies in many ways, but they are
managed by Adobe Flash Player and they
can ‘respawn’ or rewrite deleted browser
cookies, creating ‘zombie cookies’ that
can’t easily be (deleted).

Les témoins Flash sont semblables aux
témoins traditionnels, à la différence
qu’ils sont gérés par le Flash Player
d’Adobe. Les témoins Flash ont
également la capacité de ressusciter les
témoins que vous auriez effacés.

Web Beacons are invisibly embedded in
many web pages and emails. And they
can also gather information from regular
cookies at the same time.

Les pixels-espions sont des pixels
invisibles insérés dans le code d’une page
web. Ils sont capables de collecter le
même type d’information que les témoins
et sont également capables d’interagir
avec eux.

Flash cookies

Témoins Flash

Web beacons

Pixels-espions

Sale

Solde

1 pixel x 1 pixel

1 pixel x 1 pixel

IP address

Adresse IP

Times & length of visit

Moment et durée de la visite

User interaction

Actions de l’utilisateur

Text

S4 V/O [ANIMATION]
XV

Narrator In some cases behavioural tracking can be
beneficial. Websites can use tracking
mechanisms to personalize your
experience, delivering the information
you want the way you want it. Tracking
also allows advertisers to provide ads of
interest.

Il arrive que le pistage comportemental ait
des effets positifs. Les sites web utilisent
ces mécanismes pour personnaliser votre
expérience. Ils permettent également aux
annonceurs de vous montrer des
publicités qui sont près de vos intérêts.

Text

First-Party Cookies (set directly by the
website)

Témoins provenant du site web visité

“Remember this” (Or use "Save this")

Sauvegarder ceci

“You liked this”

Vous avez aimé ceci

“Try this”

Essayez cela

These might be of interest to you…

Vous pourriez être intéressé par ceci

S5 [LIVE]: STREETER CLIPS
Streeter
1

The store, knowing what I want and being
able to recommend and personalize it for
me... I would see it more as a benefit than
a detriment.

Qu’un magasin connaisse ce que je veux
et soit capable de me faire des
recommandations personnalisées… je
vois cela plus comme un avantage que
comme un inconvénient.

Streeter
2

Sometimes they can help you directly
search when shopping...

Parfois, on vous aide à trouver ce que
vous voulez.

Streeter
3

I just do it for the sake of quicker
browsing...

Je le fais parce que c’est simplement plus
efficace.

Streeter
4

I like the benefit of having things
recommended to you, saving you time.

J’aime profiter des suggestions qu’on me
fait, cela fait gagner du temps.

If they’re utilized well, then there’s a lot
of benefit, right?

Si elles sont bien utilisées, il y a plusieurs
avantages, non?

‘Cause from my perspective, I’m going to
see ads anyways, I might as well see ads
that are appealing to me.

Je vais voir des publicités de toute façon,
aussi bien voir des publicités susceptibles
de m’intéresser.

S6 V/O [ANIMATION]
Narrator But what’s gathered through tracking
could be used to discriminate against
people. Credit card companies, for
example, could deny credit to individuals
who have searched for credit counselling;
insurers could raise rates for people who
have searched for diabetes treatment.
These are only a couple of examples that
show how behavioural tracking could put
XVI

Il arrive par contre que l’information
collectée serve à discriminer un
utilisateur. Une compagnie de crédit, par
exemple, pourrait traiter différemment
quelqu’un ayant cherché de l’information
sur le recouvrement de dettes. Un
assureur pourrait offrir un prix différent à
quelqu’un ayant cherché de l’information
sur telle ou telle maladie. Ces deux

Text

you at a disadvantage: making services or
products more expensive, or even
resulting in denial of service.

exemples ne servent qu’à illustrer à quel
point le pistage comportemental pourrait
jouer contre vous sans que vous le
sachiez.

Online profile

Profil de l’utilisateur

Credit denied

Demande de crédit refusée

How much?

Combien?

An additional 10% for your condition

Un supplément de 10 % en raison de votre
maladie

Behavioural tracking

Pistage comportemental

S7-1 [LIVE]: VAL (24 SECS)
Val

Text

This type of information really does
constrain us because it’s taken out of
context.

Ce genre d’information nous contraint
vraiment, car elle est prise hors contexte.

When I’m talking to my friends online,
I’m not talking to my mother. When I’m
talking to my mother, I’m not talking to
my employer.

Quand je m’adresse à des amis en ligne,
je ne m’adresse pas à ma mère. Quand je
m’adresse à ma mère, je ne m’adresse pas
à mon employeur.

And my behaviour online depends on who
I’m interacting with. Once I lose the
ability to keep all of those various lines
between my roles in place, it becomes
really uncomfortable for all of us.

Et mes comportements en ligne vont
dépendre de la personne à qui je
m’adresse. Si nous perdons la capacité de
garder ces séparations en place, cela
devient très inconfortable pour nous tous.

Valerie Steeves

Valerie Steeves

University of Ottawa

Université d’Ottawa

Department of Criminology

Département de criminologie

S7-2 [LIVE]: JACQUIE
Jacquie

The kind of targeting that we’re talking
about, the shaping of the world around
you on the basis of information that
you’ve essentially leaked in your
practices online, has implications for the
choices that you can make, it has
implications for the options that are
presented to you.

Le genre de ciblage dont nous parlons —
la définition de notre environnement en
fonction des informations que nous avons
disséminé avec nos comportements en
ligne — a des conséquences sur les choix
que nous faisons. Il y a des conséquences
sur les options qui nous sont présentées.

Text

Jacquelyn Burkell

Jacquelyn Burkell

University of Western Ontario

University of Western Ontario

Faculty of Information & Media Studies

Faculty of Information and Media Studies
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S8 V/O [ANIMATION]
Text

And there’s not much you can do about it
under current laws.

Et les lois actuelles ne nous protègent
guère.

S9 [LIVE]: AVNER (22 SECS)
Avner

Text

Unfortunately right now we don’t have
effective protection. That’s the sad state
of where we are with all of our regulators,
and we have a system of privacy
commissioners.

Malheureusement, en ce moment, nous
n’avons pas de protection efficace. C’est
un triste état où nous sommes avec nos
législateurs, même si nous avons un
système de commissariats à la protection
de la vie privée.

That’s not an effective way for somebody
to get action in their favour if they’re
facing a problem. If they were, let’s say,
denied coverage by their insurance
company, the privacy commissioner is not
the answer to their woes.

Ce n’est pas un moyen efficace pour
quelqu’un lorsqu’il est confronté à un
problème. Si quelqu’un, par exemple, se
voyait refuser d’être assuré, le
commissariat à la protection de la vie
privée n’y pourrait rien.

Avner Levin

Avner Levin

Ryerson University

Ryerson University

Ted Rogers School of Management

Ted Rogers School of Management

Director of the Privacy Institute

Directeur du Privacy Institute

S10 V/O [ANIMATION]
Narrator So what does it take for people to realize
there need to be limits? The revelation of
the US National Security Agency’s
wholesale monitoring of internet traffic
served as a wake-up call to some.

Que devons-nous attendre pour réaliser
que certaines limites ne doivent pas être
franchies? Les révélations d’Edward
Snowden sur les activités de la National
Security Agency ont réveillé certains
d’entre nous.

Text

NSA Revelations

Révélation sur les activités de la National
Security Agency

Online surveillance

Surveillance en ligne

S11 [LIVE]: VAL (22 SECS)
Val

People might be uncomfortable if they
think, oh, someone might be watching
me, but because that kind of surveillance
is invisible online, we kind of go to sleep.

Les gens peuvent être inconfortables à
l’idée qu’on les surveille, mais parce que
ce genre de surveillance est invisible en
ligne, c’est comme si nous étions
endormis.

We kind of ignore it, because it isn’t in
our face. Typically what mobilizes public
debate around these issues are these

C’est comme si nous l’ignorions, parce
qu’elle n’est pas flagrante. Typiquement,
ce qui mobilise le débat public, ce sont les

XVIII

incidents, or episodes, like the NSA
revelations, where people kind of go
‘Hey, wait a minute, that’s not alright.

événements comme les révélations sur les
activités de la National Security Agency.
Les gens se réveillent alors et se rendent
compte que ce n’est pas normal.

S12 [LIVE]: ANDREW (40 SECS)
Andrew

Text

Great expansion of the state surveillance,
often in collaboration or collusion with
the large corporate internet providers is a
challenge to our democratic system of
government.

Une grande expansion de la surveillance,
souvent en collaboration ou en collusion
avec les grands joueurs internet, est un
défi pour nos systèmes démocratiques.

We now have installed a major spying
operation which has gone by completely
without public debate.

Nous avons désormais installé une
opération d’espionnage majeure sans que
le moindre débat public ait eu lieu.

If you think that’s ok, then I’m afraid that
you have problems with democracy,
because democracy would insist that it’s
the individual rights that take paramount,
and that the state needs to be accountable
to the citizens, not the other way around.

Si vous croyez que c’est correct, j’ai peur
que vous ayez un problème avec la
démocratie, car ce sont les droits
individuels qui priment en démocratie.
C’est l’État qui doit rendre des comptes
aux citoyens et non le contraire.

Andrew Clement

Andrew Clement

University of Toronto

University of Toronto

Faculty of Information

Faculty of Information

Identity Privacy and Security Institute

Identity Privacy and Security Institute

S13 [LIVE]: JACQUIE
Jacquie

When you’re health information online,
you can be seeking information about
really sensitive issues. And often it’s not
even about you - you can be seeking
information about somebody else.

Quand nous cherchons de l’information
relative à la santé en ligne, nous pouvons
chercher de l’information hautement
privée. Et, souvent, ce n’est même pas à
propos de nous.

But the profile that you’re developing
says an awful lot potentially about who
you are, about what you’re concerned
about, about what you’re doing, about
what your health is like.

Mais le profil que nous développons ce
faisant peut en dire long sur nous, sur ce
qui nous concerne, sur ce que nous
faisons, sur notre état de santé.

And that information can be used for the
kind of social sorting that many people
have talked about that has financial and
professional and other kinds of
implications.

Et cette information peut être utilisée pour
stratifier les gens, une pratique qui peut
avoir des implications financières,
professionnelles ou autre.

S14 V/O [ANIMATION]

XIX

Narrator Advertisers are always coming up with
new ways to collect data about you and if
you want to protect your privacy, you
need to keep up to date on mechanisms
and be aware of how to manage them.
What can we do to limit what advertisers
know about us?

Vos comportements sur internet sont une
mine d’or pour les annonceurs et ceux-ci
ne renonceront pas à l’exploiter. Si vous
désirez protéger votre vie privée, vous
devez vous tenir au courant des différents
mécanismes de pistage comportemental et
de la manière avec laquelle vous pouvez
les gérer.

Text

Solde

Sale

tS15-1 [LIVE]: STREETER 5 (YOUNG MAN) (22 SECS)
Streeter
5

There are various tools and plug-ins on
your browser that you can use to wipe
away your digital trail, to mask your
online usage, so that various companies
don’t know all these things about you.

Il y a plusieurs outils et modules
d’extension qu’on peut ajouter à nos
navigateurs qui peuvent effacer notre
empreinte en ligne de manière à ce qu’on
ne puisse pas en savoir autant sur nous.

There are often negative consequences –
you might not get cool services, but that is
a decision an individual should be able to
make.

Il y a souvent des conséquences
négatives, comme la perte de
fonctionnalité. Mais il s’agit d’une
décision qu’un individu devrait pouvoir
prendre.

S15-2 [LIVE]: JACQUIE
Jacquie It’s a matter of being aware, of thinking
about this as a possibility, of knowing the
world in which you’re operating and
taking the steps you need to take in order
to minimize your risk.

Il s’agit d’être au courant, de penser à
cette possibilité, de connaître le monde
dans lequel on opère et de prendre les
mesures nécessaires pour minimiser les
risques.

S16 V/O [ANIMATION]
Narrator Here’s a few things that you can do to
protect yourself from behavioural tracking
– always remembering there’s a trade-off
between convenience and security.

Voici quelques gestes que vous pouvez
faire pour vous protéger contre les
conséquences du pistage comportemental.
Prenez note, par contre, qu’il y a un
équilibre à atteindre entre la facilité
d’utilisation d’un site web et la protection
de votre vie privée.

Text

Convenience

Facilité d’utilisation

Security

Protection de la vie privée

Narrator READ: Protect yourself by knowing what
might be collected about you and how it
might be used by reading privacy policies
and terms of service.
You should know, however, that
XX

Sachez quelles informations peuvent être
collectées et comment elles peuvent être
utilisées en lisant les politiques de
protection de la vie privée des sites web
que vous visitez.

Text

disclosure of behavioural tracking is not
required by regulation, so if there is no
disclosure you can’t be absolutely sure
that there is no tracking.

Prenez note, par contre, que la
réglementation actuelle n’oblige pas les
sites web à divulguer le pistage
comportemental.

READ: Privacy policies & Terms of Use

Lisez les politiques de confidentialité

Disclosure not required

Divulgation non obligatoire

Privacy policy

Politique de confidentialité

“Nothing here about tracking”

Rien ici sur le pistage

Narrator DELETE/SET: Periodically delete
cookies in all the browsers that you use
OR set your browsers to refuse them.

Effacez régulièrement les témoins dans
chacun de vos navigateurs ou réglez vos
préférences pour refuser les témoins ou
les témoins provenant de tierces parties.

Text

DELETE: cookies periodically in all of
your browsers.

Effacez régulièrement les témoins dans
chacun de vos navigateurs

SET: browsers to refuse cookies

Réglez vos préférences pour refuser les
témoins ou les témoins provenant de
tierces parties

Narrator BLOCK: Install applications such as
Ghostery that identify web beacons and
allows you to block them.
Text
BLOCK: Install software that will block
web beacons.

Installez une application comme Ghostery
qui identifie les pixels-espions et vous
permet de les bloquer.

Narrator MANAGE: flash cookies by changing
Adobe Flash Player settings.

Gérez les témoins Flash en apprenant à
ajuster les paramètres du Flash Player
d’Adobe.

Text

Gérez les témoins Flash en apprenant à
ajuster les paramètres du Flash Player
d’Adobe

MANAGE: flash cookies by changing
Adobe Flash Player settings.

Narrator There are many resources online that will
help you keep on top of behavioural
tracking.
Most of all, being aware that these
mechanisms exist, understanding what
information is collected and how it might
be used is the first step to protecting your
privacy online.

XXI

Installez une application qui vous permet
de bloquer les pixels-espions

Plusieurs ressources sont disponibles sur
internet pour vous aider à gérer les
mécanismes de pistage comportemental.
Être au courant de ces mécanismes,
comprendre quelle information est
collectée et comment elle peut être
utilisée est, en somme, la première étape
pour protéger votre vie privée sur internet.

